Engagement, Containment, and the International Politics of Eurasia

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Notwithstanding the end of the cold war, Russia continued to occupy a prominent place in some of the most divisive debates in American foreign policy in the 1990s and promises to do so in this decade as well. One of these debates concerns the impact of Western economic advice and aid to Russia. While some have blamed Russia’s poor economic performance and rampant corruption on the economic prescriptions of the “Washington consensus” and American support for Russian President Boris Yeltsin against his domestic rivals, others have attributed Russia’s problems to Moscow’s half-hearted implementation of the reform program recommended by Western governments and international organizations. The debate over expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that raged in the mid-1990s also centered on Russia. While many advocates of expansion raised the prospect of resurgent Russian imperialism in the future, opponents universally stressed the reality of Moscow’s hostile reaction in the present. One round of NATO expansion is complete, yet two even more momentous decisions remain: whether to expand the alliance to include one or more of the non-Russian former Soviet republics, as is strongly advocated by the Bush administration, and whether to invite Russia itself to become a member, as was advocated by Bill Clinton during his final presidential trip to Europe and has been raised as a possibility by President Bush as well. Finally, the most basic debate among American policy makers is whether to give priority to cultivating relations with Russia—in effect, a con-


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tinuation of the Clinton administration's policy of engagement—or to give priority to bolstering the independence of the newly independent states (NIS) and to promote human rights in places such as Chechnya at the expense of trust and cooperation with Moscow—in short, renewed containment.

Resolution of each of these debates demands that attention be paid to Russian foreign policy and, in particular, the turbulent history of Moscow's relations with the non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union. In December 1991, the leaders of eleven of the Soviet Union's fifteen constituent republics dissolved what was left of the union and replaced it with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). When the Russian parliament ratified these agreements, it signified nothing less than Moscow's peaceful acquiescence to the loss of most of its centuries-old empire. Little more than a year later, however, many analysts were commenting on a rise of Russian assertiveness and a more pronounced role for the use of military force in what Russians somewhat proprietarily refer to as the "near abroad." For many, these changes marked the Kremlin's return to the imperialist ways of its past.

Whether Russia has returned to its old ways is a central question in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy toward the region for several reasons. First, debates over Russia's inclusion in NATO must address whether Moscow has been actively engaged in territorial revisionism or undermining the independence of its neighbors. If this is the case, NATO membership should be foreclosed until such policies have ceased. Second, any decision regarding whether to include the Baltic states or Ukraine in NATO should be informed by an accurate assessment of the severity of the Russian threat to these states. Third, the debate over whether Russia was "lost" in the 1990s will remain woefully incomplete until the positive and negative aspects of Russian foreign policy under Yeltsin are considered, yet few analysts have approached it from this angle. This is especially the case given that the promotion of economic growth and honest business practices in Russia are secondary goals of U.S. foreign policy compared with the avoidance of violent conflict throughout the vast expanse of Eurasia. And fourth, Washington's choice between engagement and containment most centrally depends on the record of post-Soviet Russia's behavior toward the NIS. This is the ultimate realm in which to pass judgment on either the success of engagement or the need for containment.

For these reasons, this article will examine post-Soviet Russia's relations with the NIS during the 1990s. First, it reviews debates over Russian imperialism and Western policy toward the region that have occurred in academic and policy circles. Second, it documents and analyzes the attitudes toward the NIS held by Russian policy makers and foreign policy elites as well as the policies pursued by Moscow in regard to patronage of the Russian diaspora and national security. By focusing on the substantive content and purposes of Russian foreign policy, this article adopts the in-depth, inductive approach that has been
recommended by several other analysts of state interests and identity. Third, it considers the implications of its findings for the various academic and policy debates discussed above. And fourth, it concludes with an assessment of whether previous trends have continued under Russia’s new president, Vladimir Putin, and analyzes the implications of its findings for the debate over whether Russia should be invited to join NATO.

A Return to Imperialism?

Throughout the 1990s, many of Moscow’s actions and policies toward its near abroad were interpreted on both sides of the Atlantic as evidence of Russia’s return to the imperialist ways of its past. These charges contained two core components. The first is that soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian government actively adopted the goal of restoring its political and military hegemony over the rest of the former Soviet Union. As Zbigniew Brzezinski sums it up, “Within months of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a series of spontaneous initiatives originated from Moscow, designed to flesh out and to deepen the scope of CIS cooperation, to enhance its status, to create conditions in which the CIS would, at the very outset, be more than the British Commonwealth, then approximate the European Union, then move beyond a confederation or even a federation to eventually become perhaps again just a multinational state dominated by its largest nation.” The second component is that Moscow systematically used its military in support of separatist movements in the NIS as a means of pressuring the latter to return to the Russian fold. As Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett note, “In each of the conflicts [in the republics of the former Soviet Union], there is evidence to suggest that Russia

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has intervened in such a way as to promote their escalation and/or continuation instead of their cessation."

Other observers, however, painted a very different picture of post-Soviet Russia and defended the Kremlin against the imperialist charge. Explicitly taking issue with many of the aforementioned authors, Stephen Sestanovich argued in 1994 that "the dominant interest now guiding Russian policy is [not intimidation or destabilization but] stability. For now, the picture of an expansionist juggernaut is—at the very least—far ahead of the facts." U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Thomas Pickering similarly maintained that "charges of resurgent Russian imperialism have been overstated. . . . After the Soviet Union collapsed, Moscow pursued policies—such as drastically cutting military spending—that severely limited its ability to rebuild the empire, even if it had wanted to." In an overview of points of agreement and contention in U.S.–Russian relations given just prior to Bill Clinton's participation in the Moscow summit of May 1995, Pickering went even further by describing Russia's relations with its CIS neighbors as containing "some positive trends which we strongly support." In particular, the Ambassador praised Russia for its policies toward Ukraine, the Baltics, Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Most dramatically, Leon Aron put the "Yeltsin revolution" in historical perspective by asserting that "not since the middle of the sixteenth century when the Russian expansion began, has there been a Russia less aggressive, less belligerent, less threatening to neighbors and the world than the Russia we see today."

This debate over the nature of Russian policy also served as the backdrop for a parallel debate over Western policy. Given the prevalence of Clinton ad-

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administration officials mentioned in the previous paragraph, it should come as no surprise that those analyses were frequently marshaled in defense of partnership and engagement with Russia. In contrast, analysts who viewed Russian policy as imperialist generally argued that the primary restraints on even greater bellicosity were Russian weakness and efforts by outside powers to deter Russian encroachments. Hence, they were critical of the Clinton administration’s approach to the region and advocated instead that Washington bolster the non-Russian states’ tenuous independence and contain Russian expansion. For example, Zbigniew Brzezinski writes, “Russia is more likely to make a break with its imperial past if the newly independent post-Soviet states are vital and stable. . . . Political and economic support for the new states must be an integral part of a broader strategy for integrating Russia into a cooperative transcontinental system.” Some also opposed Ukrainian nuclear disarmament, predicting that “without nuclear weapons, Ukraine . . . will be vulnerable to an expansionist Russian power. Once the nuclear weapons are gone Russia will interpret the economic grievances of ethnic Russians in Eastern Ukraine as violations of human rights.”

To provide a basis for evaluating these competing viewpoints, the following sections examine Moscow’s goals and policies toward the other former Soviet republics from their emergence as independent states through the end of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency. I focus on elite attitudes and policy in two separate issue areas—patronage of the Russian diaspora and security policy—and conclude each section with an assessment of whether Russian attitudes or policies constituted a return to imperialist ways.

Russia and the Newly Independent States, 1992–1994

Elite Attitudes

The leadership of the Russian Federation entered the post-Soviet period seeking to preserve extremely close cooperation and integration among the states of the former Soviet Union. Formation of the CIS was seen as the best available means to accomplish this goal while simultaneously avoiding bloodshed and fratricidal war with the other republics. In his memoirs, the first and last com-


12 Hill and Jewett, “Back in the USSR,” 89.

13 For accounts of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, see David Remnick, Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia (New York: Random House, 1997), chap. 1; Boris Yeltsin, Zapiski prezidenta [Diary of the president] (Moscow: Ogonyok, 1994); and Evgenii Shaposhnikov, Výbor [Choice], 2nd ed. (Moscow: Nezavisimoe izdatel’stvo PIK, 1995), chaps. 1–3.
mander-in-chief of CIS Armed Forces, Evgenii Shaposhnikov, expressed the hopes held by the Yeltsin administration at the time when he wrote, "I believe in the viability of the Commonwealth and hope that with time it will become stronger, fully reach its potential, and serve as the basis for a qualitatively new, equal, democratic union of independent states which meets the fundamental, long-term interests of its peoples." In his address to the Russian people on 30 December 1991, Yeltsin optimistically expressed the view that the Soviet Union had been replaced by "a unification of nations and states" which "has the potential to become even more solid than was the Union which was held together by commands, compulsion, and the twisting of arms." Four months later in an address before parliament, Yeltsin further expressed his hopes and fears when he stated, "The Commonwealth is at an early stage of development; that development is proceeding very painfully and with many contradictions. But its fate and future development will determine whether our peoples will in the future be divided by high walls or whether the borders between them will be only symbolic and their brotherly ties even more solid."  

Not long after the formation of the CIS, Russian elites across the political spectrum came to feel a deep nostalgia for a Russian state encompassing much if not all of the territory of the former Soviet Union. At the extreme, the nationalists and communists who supported Yeltsin's quasi-fascist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and Gennadii Zyuganov's Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) openly castigated Yeltsin for dissolving the union and campaigned on platforms of recreating either the Russian Empire of the tsars or some kind of "renewed union state." Yet displeasure over the break-up of the Soviet Union was also great among the liberals and centrists who dominated policy making, as is revealed by an opinion survey of the Russian foreign policy elite conducted in June 1993. Exactly half of those interviewed concurred with the statement that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the product of "irresponsible actions by politicians who did not compre-

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14 Shaposhnikov, Vybor [Choice], 134.
16 Ibid., 149–150.
18 The survey interviewed "113 representatives of various organizations and groups which participate in the formulation and implementation of Russia's foreign policy." Twenty-eight percent of its respondents consisted of high-level officials in Russia's executive branch, including the Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, and Security Council; 26 percent were deputies in Russia's Supreme Soviet; 13 percent were leaders of political parties; 18 percent were heads of academic institutes; and 14 percent were foreign affairs correspondents from various media outlets. All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion, Vneshnaya politika Rossii—1993: Analiz politikov i ekspertov [Russia's foreign policy—1993: An analysis of politicians and specialists] (Moscow, 1993), 6–7.
hend that we are strong only in unity.” Six percent felt more strongly that it was the “product of criminal actions” and that the break-up “should have been stopped by whatever means necessary, including military force.” And 39 percent agreed with the opposing viewpoint that “the empire was doomed, the majority of its peoples were striving to achieve sovereignty.”19 In sum, disapproval outweighed acceptance (the expression of approval was not an option) by close to a 3:2 ratio. Moreover, 70 percent of the respondents hoped for the recreation of a single state on the territory of the CIS.20 By way of contrast, attitudes regarding the “external” Soviet empire differed markedly. Fifty-five percent of those interviewed regarded the break-up of the Warsaw Pact positively as movement by its peoples “towards freedom.” Twenty-six percent agreed with the opposite opinion that its dissolution “weakened the position of our country.” In sum, approval outweighed disapproval by better than 2:1.21

Given these sentiments, it is not surprising that feelings of regret over the dissolution of the union were a regular part of the top leadership’s public discourse. For instance, in January 1992, just three weeks after voting to ratify the documents founding the CIS, Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov stated, “It goes without saying that I do not get any pleasure from the dissolution of the USSR. After all, no matter how awful the memories we each have of the past are, it nevertheless was our country. Regardless of nationality, we regarded it as our Motherland.”22 In that same month, Vice President Alexander Rutskoi wrote in the communist newspaper Pravda: “The destruction of Russia as a single state will raise in the acutest form not only the question of its so-called ‘new’ inner borders, but also its historical ‘outer’ borders. . . . The historical consciousness of Russians will not permit anyone to mechanically bring the borders of Russia in line with [the borders of] the Russian Federation and, in the process, repudiate that which constituted the glorious pages of Russian history.”23 The chairman of parliament’s Committee on International Affairs, Evgenii Ambartsumov, similarly expressed the view that “Russia is something larger than the Russian Federation in its present borders. Therefore, one must see its geopolitical interests much more broadly than what is currently defined by the map. Precisely from this starting point do we intend to develop our formulation of mutual relations with the near abroad.” He then elaborated on one of the ominous implications of this “starting point”: “I was the author of a draft resolution which proposed the annulment of Khrushchev’s 1954 decision to transfer Crimea to Ukraine on the basis of its unconstitutionality. In my

19 Ibid., 35. Five percent refused to answer.
21 Ibid., 34. Nineteen percent refused to answer.
22 Reprinted in El’tsin-Khasbulatov [Yeltsin-Khasbulatov], 111.
view, the disputed peninsula is both historically and psychologically a part of Russia. . . . And if a referendum should demonstrate that Crimeans desire the creation of an independent republic, well then. . . .”24

While never initiating comparable legislation, Ambartsumov’s successor, Vladimir Lukin, admitted the following in an interview with a leading Russian paper: “Many in my generation cannot but consider Ukraine their second homeland. This does not mean that I favor an immediate march on Kiev with troops. But I cannot pretend that Kiev is for me the same kind of city as Baden-Baden or Montevideo. That will never be the situation in my soul.”25 Finally, even though he had been a champion of the union republics’ right to self-determination during the final years of the Soviet Union’s existence, President Yeltsin himself occasionally engaged in emotional and paternalistic references to his CIS neighbors. For instance, while at a summit in the United States, he stated, “yesterday we all lived in the same house, the Soviet Union. There is no Soviet Union any more but these republics [sic] are our blood.”26

In sum, the statements of Russian policy makers and the attitudes they reflected clearly gave grounds for alarm among those who valued the newly acquired independence and territorial integrity of the former Soviet republics. The following sections will investigate the extent to which these attitudes were translated into policy.

Policy toward the Diaspora

One of the issues occupying the attention of Russian leaders in their dealings with the former Soviet republics was the safeguarding of the rights and interests of the twenty-five million ethnic Russians who after the dissolution of the Soviet Union found themselves living outside of the Russian state. As early as February 1992, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev identified “the protection of the Russian and Russian-speaking populations in other CIS states” as one of Russia’s four national interests;27 that August the foreign minister more explicitly listed “the defense of human rights, especially those of the Russian-speaking populations of neighboring republics” as one of the five main priorities of Russia’s foreign policy.28 The most significant manifestation of this concern appeared in the spring of 1992, when war broke out between the Moldovan state

24 Evgenii Ambartsumov, “Interesy Rossii ne znayut granits” [Russian interests know no boundaries], Megapolis ekspress, 6 May 1992.
and Slavic secessionists based in Moldova’s Transdniester region. The war quickly drew in the intervention of the locally based Russian 14th Army under the command of General Aleksandr Lebed’, who used the overwhelming firepower at his disposal in defense of his coethnics. While the 14th Army operated quasi-independently, the Yeltsin administration displayed a significant degree of support for its activities.29

In contrast, other regions of the former Soviet Union in Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan possessed many of the objective conditions necessary to share the fate of the Transdniester, yet avoided doing so. In the two Baltic states, citizenship was restricted largely to citizens of interwar Estonia and Latvia and their descendants, thereby disenfranchising the vast majority of Slavic residents.30 Moscow responded to this treatment of its coethnics with a great deal of harsh rhetoric as well as periodic suspensions of the withdrawal of Russian troops stationed in those countries.31 Yet the Yeltsin administration eventually resumed those withdrawals even without having achieved any substantial modifications of those states’ citizenship policies. Moreover, full compliance with Moscow’s commitments to withdraw its troops from both countries was achieved in August 1994.32

On the Crimean peninsula, a campaign to secede from Ukraine and unite with Russia was launched as early as the fall of 1991 and enjoyed overwhelming electoral success. However, as Anatol Lieven observes on the basis of interviews with leading Crimean officials, “When Crimea’s President Yuri Meshkov went to Moscow in June 1994 soon after his election . . . to seek help against Ukraine, he was not officially received. In private he was told very firmly to act with restraint and not to hope for Russian support for any moves that would risk conflict with Kiev.”33 Kazakhstan too possessed “a variety of Russian nationalist groups, including the legally sanctioned LAD and Slava groups, as well as the unsanctioned Edinstvo movement. All three enjoy[ed] wide support in northern Kazakhstan, where they have mobilized large public demonstrations in favor of dual citizenship and more funding for Russian schools, and against Kazakh remaining the sole official language.”34 Notwithstanding appeals by

these groups for kin-state support and protection, steps taken by the Kazakh government to undercut the political power of the country's Russian and Cossack communities met with little protest from the Kremlin.\textsuperscript{35}

In sum, Russian policy in regard to patronage of the Russian diaspora little conforms to the image of an overtly and actively imperialist state. Military action to advance the interests of disgruntled ethnic Russians was undertaken in only one of five potential arenas for such violence. Moscow pursued its concerns relating to minority rights overwhelmingly by peaceful means.\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{Security Policy}

In the eyes of Russian decision makers, the institutions of the CIS—the Councils of Heads of State and of Government, the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, the Foreign Ministers Council, the Defense Ministers Council, the Council of Border Troop Commanders, the Economic Court, and the Commission on Human Rights—primarily represented vehicles for the promotion of cooperation and integration between Russia and the former republics in the realms of economics and military security.\textsuperscript{37} Regarding economies, in the Alma-Ata Declaration founding the CIS, the republics pledged their "allegiance to cooperation in the formation and development of a common economic space."\textsuperscript{38} In subsequent years, Moscow advanced various proposals to further economic integration and achieved some formal success in this area. For example, in May 1993 the CIS Council of Heads of State agreed to form an Economic Union to be modeled after the European Union. The Union's founding treaty listed among its goals the "gradual formation of a single economic space on the basis of market relations" and envisaged the "free movement of goods and services, capital and labor."\textsuperscript{39}

Moscow had considerably greater interest in achieving cooperation and integration with the NIS in military and security affairs. In fact, maintenance of what Russian decision makers called a "common defense space" encompassing as much of the territory of the former Soviet Union as possible was their utmost goal in regard to the CIS. Foreign Minister Kozyrev described one of the core

\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., 69.

\textsuperscript{36}Martha Brill Olcott, Anders Åslund, and Sherman Garnett largely concur, adding that "Russia preferred to apply pressure on states that it considered to be violating the rights of local ethnic Russians through international bodies, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe..." \textit{Getting It Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent States} (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), 21.

\textsuperscript{37}A comprehensive discussion of Russian economic policy toward the NIS can be found in Olcott et al., \textit{Getting It Wrong}, chap. 2. For an analysis of this subject that reaches conclusions consistent with those reached here in regard to patronage of the diaspora and security policy, see Henry Hale, "The Rise of Russian Anti-Imperialism," \textit{Orbis} 43 (Winter 1999): 111–125.

\textsuperscript{38}The text of the agreement can be found in Brzezinski and Sullivan, \textit{Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States}, 47–48.

\textsuperscript{39}The text of the treaty, formally adopted at the summit of CIS heads of state in September 1993, can be found in ibid., 518–522.
components of democratic Russia’s conception of its national interests as “guaranteeing the security of Russia and its neighbors on a collective basis and through the preservation of a common defense space within the framework of the CIS.”40 In an extensive elaboration of Russia’s military doctrine, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev similarly wrote, “A priority for us is represented by cooperation within the Commonwealth of Independent States, with its participating states, for the purpose of solving problems of collective defense and security and of coordinating military policy and defensive structures.”41

Russian efforts to preserve a common defense space took three main directions. The first was the creation of Joint CIS Armed Forces on the basis of the preexisting Soviet military. Both during and immediately after the Soviet Union’s disintegration, Yeltsin lobbied for the preservation of a unified military.42 In February 1992, Foreign Minister Kozyrev similarly named preserving a “unified army” first among a list of Russian national interests.43 Their efforts were undermined, however, by the governments of Azerbaijan, Moldova, and most significantly Ukraine.44 As Defense Minister Shaposhnikov comments in his memoirs, “the Ukrainian leadership consistently served as the initiator and catalyst of destructive processes in the realm of defense. This began right after the events of August [1991].”45 After the formation of the CIS, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk became an outspoken opponent of joint CIS armed forces, arguing that “they could be used to strangle the democratic movements in all Commonwealth states.”46 On 3 January 1992, Ukraine began the dismemberment of the Soviet military. All Soviet officers on Ukrainian territory were immediately required to take an oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian state or leave its territory. At the CIS summit the following February, Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov announced that the Ukrainian Army already existed with over 350,000 servicemen having sworn allegiance to Kiev.47

The Yeltsin administration begrudgingly acquiesced to Ukrainian nationalization of all ground forces on its territory, yet the entire Russian political establishment vocally and unequivocally resisted Ukraine’s claim to ownership of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Specifically, the Yeltsin administration demanded ownership of the bulk of the fleet’s ships as well as sole use of the fleet’s main port facilities in Sevastopol, whereas Kiev similarly demanded the bulk of the

40 Andrei Kozyrev, *Preobrazhenie* [Transfiguration] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1995), 49.
45 Shaposhnikov, *Vybör [Choice]*, 144.
46 Quoted in Brzezinski and Sullivan, *Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States*, 450.
47 Ibid., 449.
fleet’s ships and a substantial, if not complete, Russian evacuation of that city. Russia maintained operational control of the bulk of the fleet and its facilities, yet Kiev refused to acquiesce formally to the status quo even though its stance impeded other aspects of the Russo-Ukrainian relationship. For instance, after reaching an agreement with Belarus in May 1995 on the elimination of customs barriers, Yeltsin commented: “It is more difficult with Ukraine. We are seeking contacts with Ukraine but of course until we solve the question of the Black Sea Fleet, we cannot sign such an agreement.”

Moscow achieved some initial success in preserving the Soviet military intact with the remaining CIS states. At the February CIS summit, eight of its member states reached agreements on the retention and operation of CIS Strategic as well as General Purpose Forces. In March, however, four of these states withdrew from the latter agreement. By April, Yeltsin was forced to make the following announcement before parliament: “About the army: you know that for a long time Russia made no decision about setting up its own army, trying to preserve the single Commonwealth Army. Well, that did not work. A state commission has now been set up ... to carry out the primary work on establishing a Russian Army and Navy.” The following month, Yeltsin appointed Pavel Grachev to head a newly formed Russian army, signifying Russia’s overall failure to convince the former republics to accept unified armed forces. In December 1993 at a summit of CIS defense ministers, the CIS Joint Armed Forces Command was abolished.

The second main direction of Russia’s efforts to preserve a common defense space consisted of efforts to form a defensive alliance among former Soviet republics. This alliance was embodied in the CIS Treaty on Collective Security approved at the CIS summit in Tashkent on 15 May 1992. Article One of the treaty expresses one of Russia’s central objectives regarding the post-Soviet states: “The participating states will not enter into military alliances or participate in any groupings of states, nor in actions directed against another participating state.” In return for accepting Article One’s commitment to exclude foreign powers from their security arrangements, in Article Four the non-Russian states received the promise that Russia would render “the necessary assistance including military assistance” to any other treaty participant con-

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48 Details on Russia’s handling of these issues can be found in Hill and Jewett, “Back in the USSR,” 66–85.
49 Quoted in “Yeltsin Seeks Closer Integration at Summit,” The Moscow Tribune, 26 May 1995.
50 The texts of those agreements can be found in Brzezinski and Sullivan, Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, 532–538; elaboration on the distinctions between these two types of forces can be found on 445–446.
51 Odom and Dujarric, Commonwealth or Empire? 23.
52 Quoted in ibid., 113.
54 Brzezinski and Sullivan, Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, 464.
55 The text of the treaty can be found in ibid., 541–542.
fronited by external aggression. In July 1994, a session of the CIS Council of Defense Ministers adopted a provision to the treaty specifying that “the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces are assigned the functions of providing a deterrent to potential aggressive intentions directed against states party to the treaty.”

The importance of the Tashkent Treaty to Russian decision makers was revealed in a public interview with Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Fyodor Shelov-Kovedyaev in which he termed its signatories “our allies.” High importance was attached to the treaty because of its perceived usefulness in promoting Moscow’s general goal of preventing the intrusion of outside powers into the territory of former Soviet republics. This concern was expressed in the “Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” approved by Yeltsin’s Security Council on 2 November 1993. That doctrine lists “the introduction of foreign troops onto the soil of a neighboring country” under its most serious heading of “direct military threats to Russia.” This policy goal was regarded across the political spectrum as a core national interest. For instance, one of the Yeltsin administration’s hawkish critics recommended and predicted that Russian policy would be occupied with securing this interest in Central Asia: “Russia’s long-term strategy will obviously be to prevent the advance into the region of outside countries seeking to become the dominating force. Russia will also hinder any attempts to involve these countries in military-political or economic unions with any other of the region’s great powers, whether it be Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, or some other state.”

Pursuit of this goal drew Moscow into a prolonged military engagement at the southernmost tip of Central Asia—Tajikistan. After being catapulted into an independence that they did not seek, that country’s Communist party elite continued to pursue close ties with Moscow. Over the course of 1992, however, their hold on power was challenged as civil war broke out, pitting the government against a united democratic and Islamic opposition. In November, Russia began its intervention into that conflict on the side of the pro-Moscow government. After driving the opposition’s armies into neighboring Afghanistan, the Russian army (with the participation of forces from the remaining states of Central Asia) took up defense of Tajikistan’s border against military incursions by the opposition’s forces.

56 Quoted in ibid., 470.
57 Aleksandr Gagua, “V kritike vneshnei politiki Rossii my stalkivaemsya s opasnym neprofessionalizmom” [Criticism of Russian foreign policy contains a dangerous lack of professionalism], Nezavisimaya gazeta, 30 July 1992.
58 Andrei Kozyrev writes: “Our interest in making sure that neighboring states do not present any military threats to Russia, including those stemming from the presence of foreign troops on their territory, has not disappeared but rather has grown.” Preobrazhenie [Transfiguration], 49.
61 For further details on these events, see Muriel Atkin, “Tajikistan: Reform, Reaction, Civil War” in Bremmer and Taras, eds., New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations, 602–633.
The third manifestation of Moscow's desire to preserve a common defense space consisted of efforts to conclude bilateral agreements with former Soviet republics on the basing of Russian troops on their territory. Defense Minister Grachev justified such basing in the following terms: "The need for military bases outside of Russia's territory is dictated above all by the interests of maintaining stability in individual regions. The initiators of these deployments are first and foremost those states that stand in need of additional stability factors."\(^{62}\) Even more significant from Moscow's point of view was that the establishment of Russian bases was seen as a means of keeping foreign powers out of the CIS. In January 1994, Andrei Kozyrev told a meeting of Russian ambassadors to the post-Soviet states that complete withdrawal of Russian troops from those countries should be opposed since "it would be dangerous to create a vacuum, because it might be filled with unfriendly forces."\(^{63}\) Moreover, some Russian military officers even believed that "the more Russian military bases are located on their [former union republics'] territory, the quicker a single economic and military union will be restored."\(^{64}\)

Fortunately from this perspective, Moscow's efforts to create a post-Soviet alliance system and station troops abroad enjoyed greater success than did the preservation of a unified CIS military. In particular, seven of the NIS—Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—either adhered to the Tashkent Treaty or pursued substantial bilateral military cooperation with Russia. In contrast, the remaining seven—Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Ukraine—sought to cut their ties with the Russian military and, more generally, reduce the official Russian presence in their countries.\(^{65}\)

The resistance of this latter group of states to Moscow's plans to create an integrated security system naturally generated considerable displeasure and anger among Russian elites. Moreover, Russian efforts to overcome their resistance came to include semicovert, hostile military interventions into conflicts raging on the territory of two of the uncooperative former republics. The first of these involved the war for secession from Azerbaijan waged by the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh with the undeclared yet poorly concealed assistance of their neighboring kin-state. In that prolonged conflict, the Russian military consistently manifested a strong tilt in favor of the Armenians—a stance interpreted by Azeri elites, including President Ayaz Mutalibov, as punishment for Baku's resistance to CIS integration.\(^{66}\) The second of Russia's covert mili-

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\(^{62}\) Grachev, "Voennaya doktrina i bezopasnost' Rossii" [Russia's military doctrine and security], 5.


\(^{64}\) Quoted in Brzezinski and Sullivan, *Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States*, 458.

\(^{65}\) David W. Rivera, "Conquest and Retreat in Soviet and Contemporary Russian Foreign Policy: Explaining the Wax and Wane of Empire" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1999), chap. iv.

itary interventions occurred in Azerbaijan’s neighbor to the northeast, Georgia, where an ethnically based secessionist movement broke out in the country’s northwest region of Abkhazia. Moscow responded to Georgia’s history of anti-CIS policies by providing military assistance to the Abkhaz separatists. With sophisticated Russian equipment and even air power on their side, in September 1993 Abkhaz forces managed to evict Georgian troops from their territory. After Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze agreed to join the CIS, lease Black Sea ports to Russia, and permit a Russian troop presence on an indefinite basis, Russia switched to a policy of support and military assistance for his beleaguered government.\textsuperscript{67}

The central question remaining to be answered is, where do these two partisan military interventions, combined with Moscow’s military support for the government of Tajikistan, place post-Soviet Russia on a continuum of imperialism? Even in regard to this top priority issue of preserving military integration on the territory of the former Soviet Union, Russian behavior more closely resembled peaceful respect for the sovereignty of its neighbors than bellicose imperialism for three reasons. First, of the seven states that resisted Moscow’s plans for military integration, only Azerbaijan and Georgia were punished with hostile military interventions as a result. (As discussed earlier, the Russian military’s intervention in Moldova’s civil war occurred for other reasons, although its orientation toward the CIS may have played a contributing role.) In particular, hostile action was not undertaken against Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Ukraine, even though there resided in the latter three states millions of ethnic Russians whose grievances could have provided a convenient pretext for the insertion of military forces or the pursuit of the kind of divide and conquer strategies that achieved compliance with Russian wishes in Azerbaijan and Georgia.\textsuperscript{68} Moreover, the Yeltsin administration not only abstained from attempting to exploit these opportunities but instead offered Ukraine guarantees

\textsuperscript{67} These events are discussed at some length in Hill and Jewett, “\textit{Back in the USSR},” 45–60. I am intentionally ignoring the debate over whether Russia’s covert support for the Abkhaz resulted from the initiative of troops stationed in the area rather than central direction from Moscow. Analysts expressing the former position include Dmitri Simes “The Return of Russian History,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} (January/February 1994); Oleg Blotskii, “Rossiiskie bazi—kozynaya karta” [Russian bases are a trump card], \textit{Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie}, 28 November 1996; and Nodari Simonia, “Priorities of Russia’s Foreign Policy and the Way It Works” in Dawisha and Dawisha, eds., \textit{The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia}, 31. The evidence necessary for a conclusive resolution of this debate does not appear to be currently available. I am assuming central direction, since such an assumption is less supportive of my central theses.

\textsuperscript{68} Ethnopolitical tensions in Ukraine were discussed earlier. In regard to Latvia and Estonia, Elaine Holoboff concludes, “The capacity for bringing about the downfall of any one of the Baltic states certainly exists, and it would be relatively easy for Russian intelligence forces to inflame and manipulate the dissatisfaction of the ethnic Russian population in order to destabilize these small countries.” “National Security in the Baltic States: Rolling Back the Bridgehead” in Parrott, \textit{State Building and Military Power}, 122.
of its territorial integrity in exchange for elimination of the nuclear weapons on its territory.\textsuperscript{69}

Second, none of these interventions involved the use of Russian military power at anywhere near the levels generally associated with international war. The most substantial of Moscow’s military operations in a former Soviet republic was its involvement in the Tajik civil war, yet in that conflict Russian casualties numbered less than one hundred.\textsuperscript{70} Furthermore, Russian military operations in Azerbaijan and Georgia consisted largely of the supply of arms. The participation of Russian personnel in both of these conflicts was small enough to be semicovert.

Third and most important, Moscow’s efforts to keep former republics in its strategic orbit never came to involve the pursuit or even threat of the ultimate sanction—invasion and complete loss of independence. Notwithstanding the fact that Russian elites felt a deep nostalgia for a Russian state encompassing its pre-1991 borders, the Kremlin under Yeltsin rejected the imperialist goals and tactics employed by the Communist party from Lenin through Brezhnev.

**RUSSIA AND THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES, 1995–1999**

In the second half of the 1990s, the Yeltsin administration’s interest in economic and military cooperation and integration with CIS states remained strong. Upon replacing Kozyrev as foreign minister in January 1996, Evgenii Primakov highlighted the CIS as a realm in which he would distinguish himself from his predecessor. At his inaugural press conference, the new foreign minister identified “reinforcing centripetal tendencies on the territory of the former USSR” as a central priority of Russian foreign policy, second only to strengthening Russia’s territorial integrity. In implicit criticism of Kozyrev’s alleged lack of interest in close ties with the states of the near abroad, Primakov went on to say, “Relations with Ukraine and other CIS countries will be a top priority. If the appropriate agreements are reached, I intend to take my first trips abroad to several of the capitals of these states, and then only later will I give thought to the far abroad.”\textsuperscript{71} As was the case earlier in the decade, such sentiments were felt even more strongly in parliament. The communists and nationalists who triumphed in the parliamentary elections of 1995 continued to dispute the right of the former republics to exist as sovereign states and to advocate redrawing Russia’s borders with them.\textsuperscript{72} In fulfillment of their cam-


\textsuperscript{70} Atkin, “Tajikistan,” 624.

\textsuperscript{71} “Primakov nachinaet s SNG” [Primakov starts with the CIS], *Moskovskie novosti*, 14–21 January 1996, 13.

\textsuperscript{72} Treatment of related issues in the electoral platforms of Russia’s major parties is discussed in Vladimir Mukomel, “Kto-to predпочитает Совetsky Soyuz, a kto-to Rossiiskuyu imperiyu” [Some prefer the Soviet Union, and some the Russian Empire], *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 15 December 1995.
campaign promises, in March 1996 they took the radical and provocative step of pushing a law through the State Duma abrogating the agreements founding the CIS and thus de jure reestablishing the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{73}

While Yeltsin vociferously denounced this action, his government began to pursue integration by supplementing the CIS with additional institutional arrangements. As Sherman Garnett and Dmitri Trenin observe, “Since 1995 Russian policy makers have come to recognize that progress on integration is unlikely to come through giant steps taken by the CIS as a whole, but rather through smaller steps made by individual CIS member states or groups of them.”\textsuperscript{74} This approach bore fruit on 29 March 1996, when Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan signed the Treaty on the Intensification of Integration in the Economic and Humanitarian Areas. According to Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the treaty committed its signatory states to the formation of a customs union, greater coordination of economic reforms, standardization of national legislation, increased cultural and educational exchanges, and the creation of “favorable conditions for a common market in goods, services, capital, and labor.”\textsuperscript{75}

Several days later, Yeltsin and Belarussian President Aleksandr Lukashenko signed a separate, bilateral treaty committing their two states to even closer economic and political integration. Yeltsin had earlier commented on the treaty in the following terms: “We can say more definitely [after talks with Lukashenko] that our goal is maybe unity, after deep integration. This goal is possible... We hope that it will happen not only in our lifetimes but during our presidencies.”\textsuperscript{76} On 2 April 1997 and 8 December 1999, Yeltsin and Lukashenko signed additional treaties ostensibly laying the groundwork for a full merger of the two countries.\textsuperscript{77}

Russo-Ukrainian relations improved considerably in the second half of the decade. A major stumbling block of the early 1990s was the Ukrainian parliament’s decision to retain possession of over half of the nuclear warheads inherited from Soviet arsenals—a move opposed by Moscow, Washington, and President Kravchuk himself.\textsuperscript{78} In November 1994, however, newly elected President Leonid Kuchma convinced parliament to reverse course and ratify Ukraine’s

\textsuperscript{73} “Sevodnya” [Today], Independent Television Network, Russian Federation, 15 March 1996.


accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a nonnuclear state notwithstanding the failure of Ukrainian efforts to receive Western alliance commitments.\(^7\)

Since he had run on a platform of closer ties and integration with Russia, Kuchma’s election also raised hopes in Moscow that Ukraine’s resistance to economic and military cooperation with Moscow and constructive participation in CIS institutions would become a thing of the past. However, these hopes proved unfounded as Ukraine’s orientation failed to change. Just as it was Kiev’s insistence on complete independence in 1991 that doomed Gorbachev and Yeltsin’s negotiations with the republics on transforming the Soviet Union into a genuinely federal but still unified state, so it was this second most populous of post-Soviet states that was primarily responsible for torpedoing Russian efforts to give the CIS institutional substance throughout the decade as well.\(^8\)

At the end of the decade, the CIS had failed to become “a serious security organization” with the ability to play an independent role in the international politics of Eurasia.\(^8\) As the Belarussian ambassador to the United States lamented, “The CIS... does little beyond bringing leaders from 12 of the former republics together to talk. Of the more than 700 agreements reached within the CIS framework, none seems to work.”\(^8\)

Ukraine’s policies aroused special anger among Russians interested in strengthening the bonds among CIS states, perhaps because of the central place held by Kiev in ancient Russian history. For instance, the nationalist head of the Committee on CIS Affairs in Russia’s Fifth State Duma wrote, “There is no friendship, cooperation, or partnership between Russia and Ukraine—not in intergovernmental practice, nor in the document [on Russian-Ukrainian Friendship and Cooperation] which is portrayed as being so wonderful. There is—one side—a five year history of double-dealing, weakness and deceit, as well as undeclared economic and political sanctions against Russia, the Russian language, and any Russian influence in Ukraine. On the other side there is an absence of understanding of one’s own interests and goals, confusion between departments and parties, and as a result, a policy of appeasement, forestalling concessions, and vulnerability to blackmail.”\(^8\) Notwithstanding the predominance of such views among the Russian elite, the Yeltsin administration persisted with concessions to Kiev that succeeded in resolving the long-festering dispute over the division and basing of the Black Sea Fleet. In the accord

\(^7\) \textit{RFE/RL Daily Report,} 17 November 1994. Ukrainian denuclearization was completed in 1996.


\(^8\) Such is the judgment reached by Olcott et al., \textit{Getting it Wrong,} 79 and 96.


reached in June 1997, Moscow recognized Ukrainian sovereignty over all of Crimea and agreed to pay $100 million per year for twenty years in rent for the use of Sevastopol’s central port facilities. With the nuclear weapons removed and the fleet divided on the basis of compromise, the way was at last paved for the signing of the Friendship Treaty. In October 1999, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov summed up the two countries’ bilateral relations as “fraternal” and characterized by “a different atmosphere” than was the case earlier in the decade.

Russian policy toward the diaspora also mellowed in the second half of the decade. The ceasefire reached between Chisinau and Moldova’s Slavic separatists in 1992 held without interruption for the remainder of the decade. Moreover, in the summer of 1994 the Yeltsin administration signed bilateral accords pledging the complete withdrawal of Russian forces within three years. At the close of the decade, that commitment had been partially fulfilled as the 14th Army’s original complement of roughly 5,000 troops had been reduced to 2,500. In Kazakhstan, restless ethnic Russians continued to receive little more than benign neglect. For instance, after twenty-two such individuals—twelve of whom were Russian citizens and veterans of the Soviet or Russian armed forces—were arrested for plotting to establish an “Independent Republic of Russian Altai” in northern Kazakhstan, then Prime Minister Putin responded by affirming that Russo-Kazakh relations would not be affected. The spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry added that Russia “does not meddle in Kazakhstan’s internal affairs.” Ten months after Yeltsin’s resignation of the presidency, a leader of the Kazakhstan’s Russian community complained that the former president had taken no interest in the plight of his coethnics.

Other Eurasian “hot spots” experienced notable reductions in conflict and tensions in the second half of the 1990s as well. In the early part of the decade, Azerbaijan had been wracked by ethnic civil war, self-interested meddling by the Russian military, and a patently unconstitutional yet successful putsch against a democratically elected president. It was “a classic example of a ‘failed state,’ a place marked by such an appalling level of chaos, confusion, and self-


86 RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 11 October 1999.
88 Olcott et al., Getting It Wrong, 86.
destruction that it almost did not deserve to exist.”91 However, the country subsequently entered a period of political stability made possible by a cessation of hostilities with its Armenian inhabitants and neighbors. As Rajan Menon observes, “It was because of Russian mediation that a cease-fire was negotiated among the leaders of Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Azerbaijan in May 1994. The cease-fire has held and saved an untold number of lives.”92 Moreover, after the return to power of former First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev, Baku concluded numerous multi-billion dollar oil deals that set the country on the road to economic prosperity.93 In fact, between 1996 and 2000 Azerbaijan experienced the highest economic growth of any of the more than two dozen postcommunist states.94 Thomas Goltz sums up the pendulum swing of Azeri fortunes as follows: “The change in the title of this edition of the book [from ‘Requiem for a Would-be Republic’] should speak volumes. No longer a dirge for a dead country, it is now a diary account of the rebirth, in blood and agony, of a post-Soviet republic with a future.”95

An eerily parallel story can be told about Georgia, Azerbaijan’s neighbor to the northwest, where internal peace, political stability, and relative prosperity were restored under the presidency—this time, largely democratic—of former Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.96 In Central Asia as well, Moscow mediated a peace settlement between the Tajik government and the United Tajik Opposition, ending five years of civil war in June 1997.97 At the end of the decade, Ron Suny could characterize Russia as “a relatively benign hegemon in relationship to the Southern Tier [of the former Soviet Union] rather than a neo-imperialist threat.”98

In sum, Russian policy toward the NIS in the second half of the decade has been characterized as “less confrontational” and reflective of a “gradual shift away from promoting integration through coercion and geopolitical pressure, to integration through voluntary and economy-driven processes.”99 While there is definitely truth to this characterization, the continuities with the early 1990s are as pronounced as the discontinuities. In both periods, peaceful acceptance

91 Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary, ix.
93 Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary, 452–458.
95 Ibid., ix.
96 Georgia’s economic growth between 1996 and 2000 was the third highest among postcommunist states. Ibid., tab. 4.1.
of the status quo was in greater evidence than coercive imperialism. Hence, those occupying the Kremlin deserve credit for suppressing their dissatisfaction with the status quo in Eurasia rather than manifesting it in violent action.

Conclusions

Analysts of postcommunist Eurasia have offered very different perspectives on the international politics of the region. Whereas some have viewed post-communist Russia as an aggressive bear throwing its weight around the Eurasian forest, others have portrayed Moscow as a reformed cub pursuing a policy of stability or even neglect toward its former empire. Did post-Soviet Russia quickly revert to its imperialist ways of the past? Resolving this debate is more difficult than might be expected because Russian policy contained many contradictory elements that make it difficult to characterize as a whole. For instance, all segments of Russia’s ideologically diverse political spectrum regarded the failure to maintain a union among the former Soviet republics negatively as the loss of a part of Russia itself. In addition, Moscow engaged in several military interventions in conflicts on the territory of former Soviet republics for the purpose of keeping those states in Russia’s strategic orbit.

Nevertheless, the weight of evidence more strongly supports those who defended Moscow against the imperialist charge. For every former republic that fell victim to Russian intervention, an equal number successfully rid themselves of a Russian military presence without falling victim to such intervention. The military interventions that did occur were all small-scale operations. Discontented ethnic Russians received military protection in only one of the fourteen non-Russian states, and the Yeltsin administration did not pursue territorial aggrandizement at the expense of any former Soviet republics. In addition, the second half of the 1990s witnessed heightened Russian conciliation and peacemaking as well as the consolidation of the tenuous independence of several of Eurasia’s previously “failed states.” Why Russia’s neighbors so strongly supported Yeltsin during his campaign for reelection in 1996 and throughout his presidency is now apparent. Consideration of the policies that Moscow did and did not pursue makes clear that Russia was, at most, selectively imperialist and that charges of Russian imperialism are exaggerated.

The predominance of a nonimperialist orientation of Russian foreign policy is further shown by the fact that a central prediction made by analysts who viewed Russian policy as imperialist did not come to pass. The Yeltsin administration continued to ignore Crimea’s ethnic Russian insurgents even after Ukraine denuclearized. Zbigniew Brzezinski similarly had warned that “Ukraine

100 At the May 1996 CIS summit, every CIS head of state without exception gave a speech in strong support of Yeltsin’s candidacy. For coverage of the summit, see Viktor Timoshenko, “SNG stanovitsya vliyatel’noi organizatsiei” [The CIS is becoming an influential organization], Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 May 1996 and OMRI Daily Digest, 20 May 1996. For support in subsequent years, see Olcott et al., Getting It Wrong, 26.
is on the brink of disaster; the economy is in a free-fall, while Crimea is on the verge of a Russia-abetted ethnic explosion. Either crisis might be exploited to promote the breakup or the reintegration of Ukraine in a larger Moscow-dominated framework.  

101 Now that the decade has closed it is evident that Russia under Yeltsin was not interested in exploiting such opportunities. The Kremlin thereby passed what was widely regarded as “the test case of whether Russia will remain a nation-state or seek to become again a multinational empire.”  

102 These findings contain two implications for Western policy debates of the 1990s. Regarding the “Who Lost Russia?” debate, the extent to which Russia’s rulers respected the territory and sovereignty of the former Soviet republics supports the view that Western governments and international institutions were correct to provide financial assistance to the Russian government and political support to Yeltsin. Moreover, the overall thrust of such policies should be regarded as having been correct no matter how much foreign aid was misused or how corrupt Russia’s leaders subsequently prove to have been. Both the journalists and scholars who seek to portray the spread of markets in as negative a light as possible  

103 and the politicians who found their criticisms of the Clinton administration to be useful in an election year need to bear in mind that international peace in Eurasia was not foreordained; the main contenders to replace Yeltsin—Aleksandr Rutskoi, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and Gennadii Zyuganov—all longed for a restoration of empire to a far greater extent than did Russia’s president.  

104 Moreover, if the international politics of Eurasia had been characterized by rampant warfare between Russia and its neighbors, then Russia’s economy would surely be in even worse shape today and its problems with capital flight and corruption even further aggravated.  

105 Regarding the debate over whether to pursue containment or engagement, with the benefit of hindsight we know that the Yeltsin administration did not act aggressively in the face of Ukrainian and Kazakh denuclearization or the West’s failure to provide any of the NIS with firm security commitments.

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103 For the premier example, see Stephen Cohen, Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000). Most noteworthy in regard to the conclusions reached in this study is the fact that Cohen’s sweeping indictment of the “Yeltsin regime” and its American accomplices contains virtually no complaints about Yeltsin’s policies toward any of the NIS.
104 For example, see Speaker’s Advisory Group on Russia, U.S. House of Representatives, Russia’s Road to Corruption: How the Clinton Administration Exported Government Instead of Free Enterprise and Failed the Russian People (http://policy.house.gov/russia/index.html), accessed September 2000.
105 As Duma deputy Alexei Arbatov observed in 1993, “[Russia’s neo-communists and nationalists] are prepared to reinstate the Soviet Union by military force, and advocate tough policies toward Ukraine and open intervention on the side of separatists in the Baltics, the Crimea, Moldova, and Georgia.” Arbatov, “Russia’s Foreign Policy Alternatives,” International Security 18 (Fall 1993): 14.
106 For the classic statement on the severely deleterious impact of war and insecurity on a society’s economic well-being, see Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, chap. 13.
Hence, the Clinton administration was correct to accept Russia as a responsible member of the international community and reject a policy of renewed containment. Moreover, many Russians have come to believe that the United States was actively attempting to weaken Russia’s ties and influence with the NIS, notwithstanding Washington’s largely unintrusive approach to the region. Russian anti-Americanism and paranoia would have undoubtedly taken on more dangerous proportions had such perceptions been accurate.

POSTSCRIPT: THE WEST’S POLICY TOWARD PUTIN’S RUSSIA

Future policy toward Eurasia needs to be constantly reevaluated, and the West’s approach to the region should not become complacent. The Russian diaspora still exists and, if past is prologue, Russian policy makers will remain committed to preventing the intrusion of foreign powers into the security arrangements of CIS states. In 1994, when Putin served as deputy mayor of St. Petersburg, he sternly informed visiting Western officials, “Russians in the NIS must not be subjected to any form of discrimination.” He then added, “in the interests of the preservation of peace, the world community should also respect the interests of the Russian state and Russian nation which, notwithstanding everything, is a great nation.” As president, Putin has instructed Russian diplomats to regard the expansion of ties with CIS states as “our absolute priority,” adding, “We obviously do not do enough to protect our diaspora, to protect Russian culture and the Russian language.”

As might be expected in light of such sentiments, some analysts have reported an upsurge in Russian imperialism since Yeltsin’s resignation. Echoing past debates, Brzezinski has warned that “Putin’s central goal [is] the restoration of a powerful Russian state. To the present rulers, the appearance of a dozen or so newly independent states following the Soviet Union’s collapse is an historical aberration that should be gradually corrected as Russia recovers its power.” Top U.S. government officials have also issued worrisome reports

107 For an anger-laden example by a senior Russian scholar, see Sergo Mikoyan, “Russia, the US and Regional Conflict in Eurasia,” Survival 40 (Autumn 1998): 112–126.
on this score. Moreover, Putin’s fall from power would represent an even more alarming development since his main political opponents have clearly not reconciled themselves to Russia’s truncated borders. During the campaign for the presidency in 2000, CPRF candidate Gennadi Zyuganov stated that Russia’s communists “regard the disintegration of the Soviet Union as the worst tragedy for all the peoples involved, and so we are going to make our best effort to strengthen integration policy with former Soviet territories.” More ominously, the party’s program states that for Russia to come out of its current crisis, “it is necessary: . . . to preserve the state integrity of Russia, to resurrect a renewed Union of the Soviet peoples, to guarantee the national unity of the Russian people.” In sum, Washington’s worries of the 1990s that the former Soviet lands might become a nuclear Yugoslavia are still relevant in this decade.

However, there are grounds for optimism that a pacific, nonimperialist orientation will continue during Putin’s reign. In response to Brzezinski, Sestanovich points out that when Putin speaks of “strengthening the Russian state,” the language he uses indicates that he primarily has the domestic, not international, dimensions of state power in mind. More generally, Boris Yeltsin resigned the presidency in December 1999 in the expectation that his prime minister and favored successor would continue his international policies. This expectation has so far been fulfilled as Putin’s Kremlin has retained Foreign Minister Ivanov and, most important, has not undertaken the use of military force against any of the NIS. In fact, Putin’s policies have been sufficiently moderate that even Brzezinski has begun to conclude that “the Russian elite is gradually shedding its imperial nostalgia.” This moderation and restraint might be merely a function of preoccupation with the war in Chechnya, but it might also be more fundamentally rooted in lessons Putin has drawn from history. For instance, when asked whether the introduction of Warsaw Pact forces into Hungary and Czechoslovakia were mistakes, Putin replied, “In my opinion, those were huge mistakes. And the Russophobia which confronts us in Eastern Europe today stems precisely from those mistakes.” He has also appealed to his compatriots to “abandon imperial ambitions.” Hence, Washington should continue to give

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113 RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 18 February 2000.

114 The CPRF party program can be found at http://www.kprf.ru/odfok/progr.htm, 8 June 2000.


116 The following February, Yeltsin observed that “[Putin] has chosen the right path, a path that was already determined during my office, and he is sticking to it.” RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 24 February 2000.


118 Ot pervogo litsa: razgovory s Vladimirom Putinym [From the first person: Conversations with Vladimir Putin] (Moscow: Vagrius, 2000), 160.

more weight to engagement over containment until the optimistic assumptions underlying such an approach are convincingly disproved by Russian actions.

The conclusions reached in this article bear upon the future of North Atlantic security arrangements as well. On the one hand, arguments against the inclusion of the Russian Federation in an expanded NATO are numerous and serious. First and foremost among them concerns the increased risk of war that would come from the very commitment to defend the Russian Federation's extensive southern and eastern borders from all potential attackers. Equally worrisome is the cost of converting a successful military alliance into something that might more closely resemble an ineffective collective security system. Not least among such arguments, deep-seated anti-Americanism persists among the Russian elite and clearly presents an obstacle to genuine and enduring trust and cooperation between Moscow and Washington. This is especially true of Russia's military establishment whose head of the International Defense Cooperation Department publicly describes NATO's Partnership for Peace program as a "mere backdrop to the rehearsing of military actions against Russia."

On the other hand, Russian membership in NATO might serve to reinforce and consolidate positive tendencies in Russian foreign policy, such as the absence of a military response to NATO's 1999 expansion and the Yeltsin administration's important cooperation in the implementation of NATO's peace plan in Kosovo. In addition, NATO membership would serve to slow, if not reverse, Moscow's almost decade-long movement in the direction of an alliance with the People's Republic of China, a state likely to equal if not surpass the United States in economic and military power in this century and thus the world's most likely candidate to ignite a global "hegemonic war."

The same can be said regarding Moscow's highly profitable military and nuclear cooperation with Iran. Most basically, Russian membership "would integrate a potentially threatening state into NATO and increase the overall power base of the alliance." It would also promote the continuation of Russian cooperation and assistance in future American actions against terrorist networks and rogue states. Such cooperation and assistance will be even more beneficial should pessimistic predictions of enduring conflict between the West

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121 For an example, see RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 28 June 2000. Also making this point is William Odom, "Realism about Russia," The National Interest 65 (Fall 2001): 62.
124 In the opinion of Bruce Russett and Alan Stam, "The need to prevent [a Russian-Chinese alliance] should be central to all thinking about the future of NATO." "Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China," Political Science Quarterly 113 (Fall 1998): 361. For recent manifestations of Russo-Chinese cooperation, see Patrick Tyler, "Russia and China Sign ‘Friendship Pact,’" New York Times, 17 July 2001.
125 Russett and Stam, "Courting Disaster," 380.
and the Islamic world as a whole come true. In this regard, Russia is, behind Saudi Arabia, the world’s second largest exporter of oil. Finally, whatever the relative merits of these arguments, this study has shown that the record of post-Soviet Russia’s behavior toward its newly independent neighbors cannot be legitimately construed as providing grounds for Russia’s exclusion from NATO.

It is arguably the case that the paramount objective of Russian policy toward the West in the 1990s was peaceful integration into its economic and political institutions. As is obvious since September 11, this is equally true of Russian policy under Putin. As Russia’s vice minister for foreign affairs declared to a European audience, “Moscow feels that Greater Europe must not exist without Russia, but also that Russia is an inalienable part of Europe.” Similar calls for “a much deeper union” with Europe have been issued by the chairman and deputy chairman of the Russian parliament’s International Relations Committee. More significant, Russian requests for some kind of de facto NATO membership have been increasing in frequency, and President Putin regards the creation of the NATO-Russia Council that they produced as “only a beginning.” Moscow’s orientation will continue to put the ball in the West’s court, thereby ignoring a policy debate that should be informed by recognition of some of the positive developments of the last decade. The ultimate wisdom of extending European and American defense commitments all the way to Vladivostok may be questionable, but in regard to the most important issues—giving victory to the more pro-Western candidate in all of its presidential elections, preserving peace on the vast majority of its borders, and ensuring the survival of an independent Ukraine and even such tiny, internally fractured polities as Azerbaijan and Georgia—postcommunist Russia has done its part to eliminate political and military dividing lines in Europe and bring about the country’s long-delayed unification with the West.*

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