

HISTORICAL CLEAVAGES OR TRANSITION MODE?

Influences on the Emerging Party Systems in Poland, Hungary
and Czechoslovakia

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ABSTRACT

This article tests two propositions derived from European transitions to democracy on three countries in East Central Europe: Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. On balance, the paper finds that new party systems seem to be developing differently in postcommunist regimes than they did in Southern and Western Europe. First, the political cleavages of the pre-authoritarian period that might have re-emerged after an interruption in democratic rule did not simply 'unfreeze' after the demise of communism. Second, the type of transition – whether by reform or *ruptura* – does not predict how ex-regime parties fared initially in East Central Europe. These findings suggest that, at least initially, the pre-authoritarian period and transition mode are likely to be less influential in shaping party systems than is the legacy of the communist authoritarian period. They also highlight the particularly destructive nature of communist rule in East Central Europe, in that it may have altered the bases of social and political life to a greater extent than did other types of authoritarian regimes.

KEY WORDS ■ democratic transitions ■ East Central Europe ■ Lipset–Rokkan thesis ■ party systems ■ redemocratization

The specific conditions shaping the reconstitution of politics in post-communist societies have produced several characteristic features that set East European transitions apart from other cases of democratization (Grzegorz Ekiert, 1992: 351)

As the communist states of East Central Europe collapsed in the late 1980s and joined the ranks of democratizing nations, scholars initiated a lively

dialogue about the appropriate paradigms for studying 'postcommunism'. The search for a theoretical toolbox has led some to the south in the belief that the collective wisdom about democratic transitions and consolidation developed for other regions might shed light on the former eastern bloc (Bova, 1991; Schmitter, 1994). Others argue that postcommunist societies are unique and should be studied separately from the standard 'transitions' literature (Terry, 1993).

A useful way of framing this debate is to explore the legacies of authoritarianism; that is, whether the communist experience shapes new political systems in ways that are different from other types of authoritarian rule. Although there are some excellent in-depth (and primarily single-country) studies that offer suggestive conclusions on this topic (Ekiert, 1992; Bunce and Csanádi, 1993), there are fewer cross-national analyses. In an attempt to redress this deficiency, this paper culls hypotheses from the diverse literatures on regime transitions and party systems in order to explain one important aspect of the post-transition phase in East Central Europe: party system formation. Since parties channel political participation, provide mobility opportunities for political elites and aggregate interests, they are the key to the consolidation of democracy in the region and should be studied.

This study tests two propositions derived from European transitions to democracy on three countries in East Central Europe: Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. On balance, it finds that at least in the first two post-transition elections, new party systems in postcommunist regimes exhibit important differences from the South and West European cases. First, the political cleavages of the pre-authoritarian period that – according to Lipset and Rokkan (1967) – should have re-emerged after an interruption in democracy did not simply 'unfreeze' after a long period of communist rule. Second, the type of transition – found by Bermeo (1987) to partially explain initial electoral outcomes in post-authoritarian Southern Europe – had no significant marginal effect in East Central Europe. The cases of reform-led transition did not exhibit higher levels of support for ex-regime parties than did the transition by *ruptura*. Rather, in all three cases, general dissatisfaction with the previous form of rule led to the communists' defeat vis-à-vis the opposition in the first post-authoritarian parliamentary elections. In two cases, however, this delegitimization was followed by a resurgence of ex-regime parties in the second electoral round.

These findings lend support to one interpretation of communist rule in East Central Europe that stresses its destructive nature and accompanying legacies: historical parties being unable to reconnect with their constituencies, new parties finding it difficult to establish meaningful programmatic dialogue with social groupings, opposition parties adopting 'anti-party' stances to their detriment, and most communist-successor parties enjoying resource and organizational advantages. Furthermore, the relatively open political space left in the wake of communism's demise has allowed policy

choices made by elites to have a profound effect on the bases of party support. In particular, ex-communist parties have benefited from public disillusionment with economic reform and from the weak organization of many reformist party blocs.

Thus, during the early stages of democratic consolidation in East Central Europe, the political configuration of the pre-authoritarian period and transition mode appear to be less influential in shaping party systems than is the legacy of the communist period. As such, this first appraisal suggests that the political reconstruction of postcommunist East Central Europe may well proceed differently than that of other post-authoritarian states, especially in Western and Southern Europe.

Theoretical Foundations

This project explores two plausible explanations of party system formation in the postcommunist period. The first concerns the legacy of the *pre-authoritarian* period, namely the influence of a previous phase of democratic rule on post-authoritarian party development. In an explanation of party system formation in Europe, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) hold that parties tended to crystallize around four basic social cleavages. The latter are themselves the product of two revolutions: the national revolution, which produced center-periphery and state-church cleavages, and the industrial revolution, which led to the formation of land-industry and owner-worker divides. Moreover, those cleavages that were present during the final phase of suffrage extension in a country fundamentally shaped its party system, the basic contours of which then would survive even in the face of social or political change. Thus, the authors contend that 'the party systems of the 1960's reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920's' (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 50).

In their case studies of democratic interruption, however, the authors' predictions about the survival of political cleavages are somewhat vague. On the one hand, Lipset and Rokkan seem to link the unfreezing of a party system after an authoritarian episode with the level of its institutionalization in the pre-authoritarian period, notably with the local entrenchment of party organizations. On the other hand, they claim that 'the continuities in the [party] alternatives are as striking as the disruptions in their organizational expressions' even in France, Germany and Italy, despite the fact that in Italy a 'structurally responsive party system' was in place for only 3 years before the March on Rome (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 52-3).

Not surprisingly, subsequent studies of redemocratization in Europe and Latin America arrive at mixed conclusions on the re-emergence of traditional alignments after the demise of authoritarianism. Linz (1980) argues that the Spanish party system after Franco – in contrast to that of post-war Germany and Italy – is marked by discontinuity with its democratic past, particularly

by the disappearance of bourgeois republican parties on the center-left. The 1984 Bartolini and Mair volume concurs with this view, contrasting Spain with Greece, whose 7-year dictatorship froze rather than eradicated traditional party politics. On the other hand, Linz notes that post-authoritarian Spain does evince continuity with the past in its geographical distribution of electoral support. He observes the following:

If we were to look at the electoral maps of 1933, 1936, 1977, and 1979 we would recognize the areas of strength of the main political tendencies and even of parties, sometimes with the same name, others with a different name and identity. But the extension of the areas of influence and the intensity of their presence would be somewhat different. In this Spain does not differ from other European countries after the authoritarian interlude in spite of all the changes in the social structure and the political spectrum.

(Linz, 1980: 178)

So what determines these varying outcomes? Factors associated with the authoritarian episode have been shown to be influential in determining the amount of continuity present, namely: the duration of the authoritarian period (Pasquino, 1990; Sgouraki-Kinsey and Hamann, 1993); repression levels (Remmer, 1985); and the kinds and extent of mobilizational efforts undertaken by the authoritarian regime (Remmer, 1985; Geddes, 1995). Important for this study, attributes of the pre-authoritarian time frame have also been demonstrated to be important. Remmer (1985) finds that the older the party system is prior to the onset of authoritarian rule, the more continuity is observed. More generally, in discussing whether vibrant party systems emerged in post-authoritarian Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal, Pasquino (1990: 46–7) pays special attention to the extent of parties' organizational development and social implantation during the previous democratic period.

Despite such intriguing findings, there have been few attempts to test the applicability of Lipset and Rokkan's model in the former eastern bloc. One explanation for this is the vast literature on the decline of traditional cleavages and dealignment in Western Europe in the 1970s that casts doubt on the continuing relevance of the Lipset–Rokkan hypothesis. This debate, however, is far from over; for example, Bartolini and Mair's data 'offer strong confirmation of the freezing hypothesis', at least with respect to the class cleavage (1990: 101). A second explanation is that some would argue that because all of the inter-war Central European democracies except Czechoslovakia became authoritarian in the 1920s and 1930s, their democratic histories are too brief and weakly institutionalized to matter.

Instead of dismissing these experiences outright, however, I submit that their relevance should be tested. Thus I expect that if Lipset and Rokkan are correct, party alternatives in present-day East Central Europe should display striking historical continuities; moreover, in Czechoslovakia – which had two decades of stable democracy – this should come close to a virtual

‘unfreezing’ of previous alignments. Should such patterns emerge, this will lend strong support to Lipset and Rokkan’s thesis in that even the massive efforts of the East European communist regimes to remake their political systems did not destroy existing patterns of political competition.¹ Moreover, if Czechoslovakia exhibits significantly more continuity with the past than Poland and Hungary, this will show that political alignments in the postcommunist world are affected by the duration of a previous democratic episode in a manner similar to those in Western and Southern Europe.

The second explanation to be explored in this paper centers not on the importance of the pre-authoritarian experience in explaining party system outcomes, but on the *mode of transition* from authoritarianism.² In an attempt to explain why right and center-right forces fared well in the transition elections of post-Franco Spain yet poorly in Portugal’s post-authoritarian political landscape, Bermeo (1987) concludes that the nature of regime transformation is a key factor.³ The reformist transition strategy followed by Spain’s authoritarian elites lent them credibility in the first post-authoritarian elections, whereas Portugal’s sudden *ruptura* discredited regime forces and disadvantaged them in the ensuing elections. These disadvantages included: mass mobilization which forced the right to move gingerly, removal of the upper echelons in the media that were associated with the old order, and radicalization of the print media. The difference in outcomes also depended on the development of social groups during the authoritarian period, in that Spain had developed a modern middle class supportive of a center-right coalition whereas Portugal had not. In addition, a strong semi-opposition had developed in Spain under Franco which could direct and then benefit from the *reforma* (see also Linz, 1980, for a similar discussion).⁴

Although Bermeo’s explanation focuses on the legacy of the authoritarian period (e.g. the class structure and the nature of the opposition) as well as on the mode of transition, this paper examines only the effect of the latter. Hence, I expect that in countries in which those within the regime initiated and largely controlled the political reform process (i.e. Hungary), the communist-successor parties will fare better in initial post-authoritarian elections than in countries that had a rapid, mass-based transition by *ruptura* (i.e. Czechoslovakia). Poland should fall somewhere in the middle, in that the ruling communists did choose to participate in round table negotiations but only under pressure from a strong mass-based movement and significant strike activity. And subsequent events accelerated the transition process far beyond the regime’s original plan, which had been designed to allow some participation by the opposition but to preserve the communist party’s ruling position. If this hypothesis is shown to be correct, it will indicate that postcommunist party systems are affected by the nature of regime transformation in the same way as were the South European post-authoritarian cases.

Case Selection

Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were selected for this study because they exhibit variation in the two relevant independent variables: the length of their pre-authoritarian democratic periods and the type of transition from authoritarian rule (though only one explanatory variable is used in testing each hypothesis). These are summarized in Table 1. A couple of caveats should be stated before proceeding. First, the project does not take into account the literature on electoral systems as an explanation of party system outcomes.⁵ In my view, this is justifiable because: (1) the analysis does not use parliamentary seats obtained but percentages of the popular vote won;

Table 1. Variations in the length of the pre-authoritarian democratic period and the mode of transition to democracy

Country	Date of last pre- authoritarian parliamentary election	Date of first freely competitive postcommunist parliamentary election	Democratic period (years)	Transition mode
Poland	1922	1991 ^a	8 (1918–26)	Extrication ^b
Hungary	1945 ^c	1990	2 (1945–7)	Reform
Czechoslovakia	1935 ^d	1990	20 (1918–38)	<i>Ruptura</i>

^a The partially competitive parliamentary elections held in Poland in 1989 are not used in this analysis because only 35% of the seats in the more powerful lower house, the Sejm, were freely contested. Moreover, these are not the same as the ‘founding elections’ discussed in the transitions-to-democracy literature, i.e. those ‘marking the end of the transition from authoritarian regimes by the selection of a new democratic government’ and which are characterized by free and direct party competition. Instead of signalling the beginning of a new political system, the 1989 Polish elections helped *initiate* the transition process (Olson, 1993a: 417).

^b Recent work on democratic transitions has added this third category – extrication – to the possible modes of transition. In a transition through extrication, ‘the authoritarian regime is weakened, but remains strong enough to dictate important terms of the transition’ (Mainwaring, 1992: 322–3). In the Polish case, this refers to the *initial* round table agreement of April 1989; Solidarity’s unexpected triumph in the June 1989 elections ‘fatally undermined the [transition] plan and greatly accelerated the speed of the decay of Communism’ (Pelczynski and Kowalski, 1990: 347). Note that these terms developed for Latin America and Southern Europe ignore the international context within which decisions about possible transition options were made in East Central Europe, i.e. the role of the USSR.

^c Although the 1945 elections were the ‘freest ever held in Hungary’, the outcome of these elections was restricted due to a pre-election agreement of the coalition government to remain intact regardless of the electoral outcome. Parliamentary elections were also held in Hungary in 1947, but these are not counted because of ‘considerable intimidation and fraud’ and also because the communists’ ‘salami tactics’ had allowed them to gain a considerable measure of control over the country by this time (Rothschild, 1989: 99–102).

^d Czechoslovakia had a period of ‘limited pluralism’ during 1945–8. Elections were held in 1946 but these were not entirely free, as a ‘number of pre-war parties had been banned for alleged cooperation with the Nazis, including the largest pre-war party, the Agrarians, and participation in the elections was restricted to parties in the governing coalition’ (Wightman, 1990: 326).

(2) in both time periods, elections to the lower houses of all three countries are based on proportional representation (although Hungary currently uses a combination of proportional representation and single-member districts in elections to its unicameral parliament); and (3) probably the major difference among the postcommunist systems is the lack of a threshold in Poland's 1991 elections. Arguably, this did contribute to the proliferation of parties and the ensuing public dissatisfaction with the Sejm; however, the electoral law was changed by the second round of elections to include a threshold. Second, the phrase 'democratic period' signifies a regime in which leaders are selected by means of freely competitive elections. Although this is certainly a minimalist definition (Karl, 1990), I believe it captures that dimension most relevant to the development of party systems. Moreover, since we want to explore whether older democracies exhibit markedly greater continuity with the past, we need to include countries in which the democratic experience was shorter and therefore less established. The third caveat is that the use of pre-authoritarian elections from both the inter-war and immediate post-Second-World-War time periods might confound the analysis, in that the period of 'democratic interruption' may encompass more than just the communist experience. For Poland, this includes the inter-war Piłsudski dictatorship, German occupation and communist rule; for Hungary, this covers only the post-war communist period.

Results

Lipset-Rokkan Hypothesis

Testing the first proposition regarding continuity between pre-and post-authoritarian party systems could be done in at least two ways: by measuring trends in the aggregate support for individual parties over time (Rose and Urwin, 1970; Remmer, 1985) or by testing whether the relevant social cleavages are powerful predictors of party alignments in the *current* time period (Knutsen, 1989).⁶

The first approach has been criticized as a misinterpretation of the Lipset-Rokkan hypothesis because it assumes that changes in the electoral fortunes of individual parties represent shifts in the underlying political cleavage structure (Lybeck, 1985; Bartolini and Mair, 1990). It is all the more problematic for Eastern Europe, as existing parties were either abolished or incorporated as communist satellites during the communist takeover.⁷ Therefore, I contend that the best approach is to analyze whether the four traditional social dimensions are important for party choice in the current time period and, in addition, to examine whether there are general continuities in the political cleavages of the pre- and post-authoritarian periods.⁸ In this way, we can evaluate whether there is a measure of continuity in the underlying political subcultures despite institutional discontinuity in party organizations (Ágh, 1994).

Table 2. Comparison of the main political cleavages of the pre- and post-authoritarian periods

<i>Country</i>	<i>Last pre-authoritarian parliamentary election</i>	<i>First postcommunist parliamentary election</i>	<i>Second postcommunist parliamentary election</i>
Poland	Land–industry Center–periphery ^a State–church Owner–worker	Land–industry State–church Reform–anti-reform	Land–industry Reform–anti-reform
Hungary	Land–industry Center–periphery State–church Owner–worker	Land–industry Center–periphery State–church Regime–anti-regime	Reform–anti-reform Land–industry State–church
Czechoslovakia	Owner–worker Center–periphery State–church	Regime–anti-regime Center–periphery State–church	Reform–anti-reform Center–periphery State–church

^a Although Lipset and Rokkan define the ‘center–periphery’ conflict as that between the central culture and its ethnically, linguistically or religiously distinct subpopulations, I am using the term to include a state’s claim on the territory of its neighbors as well.

Table 2 summarizes the continuities and discontinuities in the bases of party competition between the time periods. In the absence of comprehensive electoral data on the voting behavior of specific social groups, I used holistic accounts of the pre- and post-authoritarian party systems, aggregate electoral data (see Appendix) and descriptions of the orientations and social bases of individual parties to determine what I take to be the salient political cleavages in each time period. One potential problem is that Lipset and Rokkan assume that parties reflect the critical lines of conflict in society, though they qualify this by stating that not all social cleavages find political expression in the party system. For simplicity, I assume that the most important social cleavages will be represented by parties, but in so doing may overlook unrepresented cleavages and/or collective action problems of party formation. Note too the indeterminacy about which cleavages are most salient for *individual* party preferences.

Poland. Poland’s inter-war cleavages fall along all four lines: urban–rural, nationalist (with an overlapping clerical split) and, to some extent, an owner–worker cleavage. Both the radical Wyzwolenie (Liberation) Peasant Party and the more moderate Piast Peasant Party enjoyed fairly consistent support, while Piast was the leading ‘broker’ party in Poland’s inter-war coalitions. Poland’s strongest political grouping in the inter-war years, however, was the National Democratic Party, an intensely nationalist, conservative and anti-semitic party that ‘enjoyed more support from the

Catholic Church than any other group' (Seton-Watson, 1962: 159).⁹ 'Basically bourgeois in its appeal', it endorsed private enterprise and the rapid development of industry under exclusively Polish ownership (Rothschild, 1974: 31; Walters, 1988: 183). This was counterpoised by the Polish Socialist Party, which declined in importance after Józef Piłsudski's abandonment of it in the first years of the inter-war period. Both these groups had diametrically opposed views of the desired nexus between church and state: the National Democrats viewed the church as the 'director of [the Nation's] moral life' and wanted an 'appropriate position' for the church in the state, whereas the socialists advocated church-state separation and universal compulsory lay education (Polonsky, 1972: 58, 72). Finally, the strength of the nationalism cleavage is evident in the numerous ethnic minority parties – which reached 33 by 1926.

Poland's initial postcommunist party system exhibits some continuity with the inter-war period in that church-state divisions were salient. Indeed, clashes over the role of religion in public life created some of the 'most bitter moments of the 1991 campaign' (Tworzecki, 1994: 181). In the 1993 campaign, however, religious issues declined in importance. The Catholic Church was less involved in the political process (Tworzecki, 1994: 182), and the right-of-center parties identified with the church did less well – a defeat that some say reflects voter hostility toward the Catholic Church's attempts to pursue its moral agenda through legislative means (Vinton, 1993: 23). Finally, it appears that the urban-rural (land-industry) split has become stronger than it was in the past. Although in early 1991 it seemed as if strong rural parties could form the basis of a united appeal, the peasant parties remained split and this diminished their influence (Millard, 1992: 843). However, by 1993, the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) had become a uniform 'class' party representing Polish farmers; some studies show that 50 percent of all rural dwellers voted for it (Vinton, 1993: 22).

On the side of discontinuity, the center-periphery dimension did not play a large role in either election. In contrast to the inter-war period when minorities comprised about 31 percent of the population, Poland is almost completely ethnically homogeneous today; although there is a party representing the German minority, its influence is minimal. Also, the leading force in Catholic Election Action, the Christian National Union, spoke in the election campaign about Poland's former eastern regions – now part of Ukraine – but this appeal did not go far (Webb, 1992: 169). Similarly, the mild owner-worker cleavage of the inter-war years had largely disappeared; as one observer remarks, 'class cleavages ... remain somewhat inchoate' (Millard, 1992: 852). Finally, a reform-anti-reform cleavage emerged in the first freely competitive elections and deepened in the second round.¹⁰ In 1991, the ex-communist Alliance of the Democratic Left came in second, reflecting a disillusionment with Solidarity and the economic reform program of finance minister Leszek Balcerowicz. This was reinforced in 1993 as the 'Polish electorate appears to have opted for parties representing relatively

moderate opposition to the program of economic transformation begun in 1989' (Vinton, 1993: 21). Unlike the Polish Peasant Party, the Alliance of the Democratic Left has a mixed constituency; thus the driving forces behind Poland's current party alignments seem to be an urban–rural divide coupled with a split centered around the economic transformation program.

Hungary. In Hungary's first and last democratic elections held before the onset of communist rule, the country's traditional rural culture brought a massive resurgence to the Independent Smallholders' Party. Representing middle-class peasants who owned less than 100 cadastral yokes of land, this member of the coalition government won 57 percent of the popular vote in 1945 and was clearly the dominant party in Hungary. The other three cleavages discussed by Lipset and Rokkan were also present, but to a much lesser degree. Although the Communist Party (which had been banned during the inter-war years) enjoyed organizational advantages and support from the Soviet administrators of the Allied Control Commission, it received only 17 percent of the vote. The Social Democrats won slightly more. In addition, nationalism had always been part of Hungarian politics, for many years centered on revisionist aspirations due to the territorial losses incurred under the Trianon Treaty. Thus Hungary's dominant cleavage lines after the Second World War were primarily urban versus rural (with an overlapping subtext of nationalism and religion), and, to a much smaller extent, owner versus worker.

Like Poland, Hungary also exhibits some continuity with the past in the first postcommunist parliamentary elections, particularly with reference to its rural–urban divide. As Köröseyi (1990: 338–44) notes, early in 1989 the resurrected Smallholders' Party raised the question of landed property, claiming that collectivized land should be returned to its original owners. Not surprisingly, this party has been strong in rural areas, receiving most of its support from the villages, along with the Christian Democrats (Kovacs, 1993: 265). However, its overall support has been lower than expected, even dropping in 1994 (though of all the historic parties mentioned in this paper, it has made the strongest showing). These rural groups have been balanced by the liberal western-orientated Alliance of Free Democrats, with its support base in Budapest and the more urbanized areas of northwestern Hungary. The historic center–periphery divide is evident in Hungary's 1990 elections, in that the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) – in contrast to the more urban, liberal and secular opposition groups – gave expression in the first round of elections to 'the national issues and Christian traditions of Hungary's rural society' (Bruszt and Stark, 1991: 219). It stressed nationalism and emphasized the plight of ethnic Hungarian minorities abroad (Kovacs, 1993: 257–8). Finally, it stressed the importance of Christian values, attempting to build its image as a Christian Democratic party after the fall of 1989 (Köröseyi, 1990: 337). Religious sentiments were also represented by the historic Christian Democratic People's Party, which was mostly aligned with the church on moral issues (Kovacs, 1993: 258).

However, discontinuity is also evident in Hungary's first freely competitive postcommunist elections. Köröseyi (1990: 338, 345) points out that the 'absence of a traditional social democratic party' was a striking phenomenon, as the historic Social Democratic Party did not turn back to its original working-class constituency. Rather, the results were partly a referendum on the years spent under the previous regime – a 'one-time collective anti-communist temper tantrum' (Tökés, 1992: 186).¹¹ Later, as in Poland, the hardships of economic transition brought forth a strong reform–anti-reform cleavage based on the desire for economic social security that the communist-successor parties seemed to promise (Oltay, 1994b: 1). Although the Hungarian Socialist Party came in fourth in the first round of parliamentary elections, a prescient observer pointed out that this was not a 'decisive defeat of the left' (Racz, 1991: 118–19). Indeed, this phenomenon coalesced in 1994, as the Hungarian Socialist Party won approximately 33 percent of the territorial list vote. Finally, as in Poland, this leading party in the second elections did not represent one or two social bases but appealed instead to a broad range of social groups.

Czechoslovakia. In inter-war Czechoslovakia, the owner–worker cleavage was strong, with the left-leaning indigenous communist party counterpoised by the National Democratic Party representing the commercial and industrial strata. The Agrarian Party was Czechoslovakia's consistently strongest and most pivotal, eventually moving beyond its original agrarian constituency to become a 'holding company' for general middle-class interests (Rothschild, 1974: 97). With its base in the developed Czech regions of Bohemia and Moravia, it represented medium landholders or large farmers and provincial bourgeoisie against working-class interests (Seton-Watson, 1962: 174). Thus it seems logical to consider this party a component of the owner–worker and not the land–industry cleavage. The center–periphery split was also strong in pre-communist Czechoslovakia; indeed, rivalry between the nationalities was Czechoslovakia's most severe problem (Walters, 1988: 202–3). This manifested itself in Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, the main vehicle agitating for Slovak nationalism; the numerous ethnic minority parties, particularly among the 3.2 million Germans (who left during or were expelled after the Second World War); and the highly nationalist, panslavist and anti-clerical bent of the National Democratic Party. This anti-clericalism was balanced by the Catholic, or so-called Populist (People's) parties (although the Slovak version was primarily occupied with agitating against Czech centralism).

In the postcommunist period, there is no pronounced owner–worker divide; although the Communist Party was relatively successful in the first electoral round, its voters were evenly spaced in the regions and among communities of different sizes. This is in contrast to the traditional support base of the Communist Party, which had been in the industrial regions to the west of Prague (Jehlička et al., 1993: 242). Moreover, although social democracy

was one of the most important political currents during the First Czechoslovak Republic, it did not re-emerge in any particularly noticeable fashion. One analyst explains the poor performance of the Socialists and Social Democrats this way: the 'forty years of communism must certainly have disrupted traditional identification with those parties' (Wightman, 1991a: 110). In 1990, there was clearly a broad-based regime–anti-regime axis symbolized by the overwhelming success of the umbrella movements, Civic Forum/Public Against Violence. By the 1992 parliamentary elections, the issue of regime choice was over and one of the larger issues to emerge was – as in Poland and Hungary – the question of economic transition, which was most salient in the Czech Republic.

Similar to the inter-war period, however, the center–periphery cleavage was strong, with religious and nationalistic cleavages even sharper in Slovakia than in the Czech lands. In 1990, distinctive Czech and Slovak parties emerged, the Slovak National Party gave voice to Slovak separatism, Coexistence represented a range of minority nationalities, and regionalism manifested itself in the Czech Republic's Movement for Self-Governing Democracy (Wightman, 1990: 321). In 1992, the issue of federalism – along with that of economic reform – dominated the party agenda, especially in Slovakia. There, all major parties advocated greater Slovak autonomy and some pressed for secession (Olson, 1993b: 304). This suggests that the 1992 elections were a continuation of unresolved and enduring ethnic and regional tensions. As Olson (1993b: 305) notes, the place of Slovakia within the larger federation had been an issue since the very beginning of the state and was now assuming heightened importance in the postcommunist period – which of course culminated in the 1993 dissolution of the federation.

This general comparison highlights how there is some continuity in all three countries between the pre-authoritarian and postcommunist periods, but that contrary to expectations the continuity is not markedly greater in Czechoslovakia than in Poland or Hungary. In fact, in the least likely case – Hungary – we see one of the swiftest developments of programmatic parties appealing to pre-communist themes.¹² Moreover, the continuities in political cleavages we do observe are not simply historical alignments that 'unfroze' after decades, but rather reflect the social configurations in place at the time of the postcommunist elections. For example, the fact that private ownership of farms remained largely undisturbed in communist Poland goes a long way toward explaining the strong postcommunist urban–rural divide. And those social cleavages such as ethnic rivalries that were not fundamentally changed by the communist regime – but only papered over – had resonance in the postcommunist political structure.¹³

Finally, party systems in all three cases exhibit broad-based ideological divides birthed by the communist period: the initial repudiation of communist rule and the later controversy over how fast and how far to dismantle state socialism. This means that, on the whole, parties in the initial postcommunist parliamentary elections did not represent deep social divisions

but rather were fluid organizations appealing to a broad spectrum of social groups (Bunce and Csanádi, 1993: 254–5). According to Ágh's convincing description of these 'hopelessly elite parties,' we find that

... the genetic defect of the new ECE [East Central European] party systems is that almost all parties claim to represent the whole nation directly with no prejudice for special interests (of groups, strata and classes). Therefore they are exclusivist and overcompetitive, still faceless in the eyes of the population and without a solid party identity.

(Ágh, 1994: 230)

The political landscape in East Central Europe may thus be taking shape in the shadow of the communist interlude, rather than emerging from the ashes of the pre-authoritarian era.¹⁴

Bermeo Explanation

The second hypothesis to be examined in this paper – that in the initial post-authoritarian parliamentary elections, ex-regime parties will fare better in countries whose transition was by 'reform' rather than by *ruptura* – is tested by grouping the parties in each country according to their institutional origins and comparing each group's success at the polls. A party is classified as a communist successor if its predecessor is a communist party or any of its satellites,¹⁵ as an historic party if it claims to be the rightful successor of a party that existed in the pre-authoritarian period and whose organization was dissolved during the onset of communist rule, as an opposition-based party if it emerged from the Civic Forum/Public Against Violence or the religious opposition in Czechoslovakia, Solidarity or other dissident groups of the 1970s or 1980s in Poland, or the opposition movements of the late 1980s in Hungary,¹⁶ and as a new party if its origins are not described by any of the above categories (see Appendix for coding). The results are shown in Table 3.

Bermeo's explanation would predict more support for remnants of the previous communist regime in Hungary and Poland than in Czechoslovakia because they should have been given credit for negotiating the transition from authoritarianism. As Hibbing and Patterson (1992: 435) state, in Hungary 'the reform Communists were given token credit for administering the transformation to democracy, which is reflected in their modest share of the popular vote'. This prediction, however, is not borne out by a comparative look at the data. In the first round of elections, Poland and Hungary show an average of 19.89 percent of the vote going to communist-successor parties, while both regions of Czechoslovakia exhibit a slightly higher average of 20.15 percent.

Of course, one might argue that the hypothesis has an inherent bias toward failure because of the extreme illegitimacy of the communist regime in Poland. Indeed, based on the semi-competitive 1989 Polish elections which were an indisputable repudiation of communist rule, it is not hard to

predict that the communists in Poland would do poorly in a more open electoral contest. (That they did not do worse can be explained in part by the start of the economic reform program before the first round of freely competitive elections, which inflated the communist-successor vote.) However, this same hypothesis should be biased in the other direction concerning Hungary. That is to say, in contrast to the rest of Eastern Europe, the reformist evolution of Hungary from the late 1960s on tended to 'blur' the distinction between communists and non-communists (Bunce and Csanádi, 1993: 243). One would expect, therefore, that the reform communists in Hungary would fare much better than the remnants of Czechoslovakia's ruling regime, but this is not so. Hence, it appears that in all three countries, the first post-authoritarian elections were a referendum on and rejection of communist rule regardless of the role that the ruling elite played in the transition process – especially if one also takes the 1989 semi-competitive Polish elections into account (Bunce and Csanádi, 1993: 248).¹⁷

As shown in Table 3, the second round of parliamentary elections is closer to validating the proposition at issue. Support for Poland's and especially Hungary's communist-successor parties significantly increases (to an average of 35.45 percent), whereas the average support for such parties in the two regions of Czechoslovakia remains relatively stable at 19.80 percent. Figure 1 illustrates the differences between votes received by all communist-successor parties in the two time periods. This phenomenon, however, is not

Table 3. Percentage of total vote won by type of party, first two freely competitive postcommunist parliamentary elections

<i>Country/Election</i>	<i>Communist-successor</i>	<i>Opposition-based</i>	<i>Historic</i>	<i>New</i>	<i>Other/Invalid</i>	<i>Total^a</i>
Poland						
1991	22.06	58.38	2.73	6.10	10.73	100.00
1993	35.81	53.09	1.19	2.74	7.17	100.00
Hungary						
1990	17.72	55.03	22.53	1.89	2.83	100.00
1994	35.09	38.50	15.85	0.00	10.56	100.00
Czech Republic						
1990	20.58	57.50	3.84	12.76	5.33	100.01
1992	23.17	43.27	7.67	13.63	12.26	100.00
Slovak Republic						
1990	19.71	51.50	1.89	23.33	3.57	100.00
1992	16.42	51.88	4.86	16.76	10.09	100.01

^a May not sum to 100.00, due to rounding.

Sources: Computed by author based on the following sources: 'Bulletin of Electoral Statistics and Public Opinion Research Data' (1993); Hibbing and Patterson (1992); Körösenyi (1990); Millard (1992); Olson (1993b); Oltay (1994b); Pehe (1992); Racz (1991); Racz and Kukorelli (1995); Sanford (1991); Swain (1991); Vinton (1993); Webb (1992); Wightman (1990, 1991a, 1991b).




Figure 1. Combined vote for successor parties

entirely a delayed reaction to the nature of the regime transition, although that may have played a marginal role. Rather, most analysts conclude that the results in the second round of parliamentary elections are explained by two factors: discontent with the pace and outcome of economic reform in Poland and Hungary; and differences in the political strategies and perceived competence of party elites, as well as their use of resources. These are discussed in turn.

First, and not surprisingly, perceptions of individual well-being as shaped by the economic transition process play an extremely important role in post-communist voting decisions. Although Poland has recently made positive strides according to aggregate economic indicators, it suffers from general perceptions of declining prosperity. Analysts attribute the comparatively high percentage of votes going to the left in *both* the 1991 and the 1993 elections to the worsening economic situation; the Polish electorate opted for a relatively moderate opposition to the economic reform program – voting for parties that would give the market system a more ‘human face’ and against those they held responsible for the socio-economic pains of the transition (Vinton, 1993: 21; Pacek, 1994: 735; Zubek, 1994: 822). Similarly, in Hungary, the 1994 vote seemed to express a longing for the best features of Kadarism, when there was full employment and social security (Oltay, 1994a: 21). Also, in economically distressed Slovakia, the 1992 elections witnessed a notable shift toward parties advocating a slower economic reform program, though this platform was not limited to communist-successor parties and was in fact embraced by Vladimír Mečiar’s ‘opposition-based’ Movement for a Democratic Slovakia.

The strength of this vote for communist-successor parties also depends on the success of the traditional left in fashioning itself as a ‘social democratic’ party. In the initial elections in Hungary, leftist groups did so poorly in part

because there was no successful social democratic party with strong blue-collar and trade-union backing; the Social Democratic Party – due to leadership struggles, difficulty in recruiting candidates, and the fact that it ran a poor campaign – won only 3.6 percent of the vote in 1990 (Körösi, 1990: 345). Moreover, the reform communists did not succeed in creating a credible social democratic party in 1990 either, since ‘there was no clear separation from the former MSZMP [communist] philosophical basis and the umbilical cords to Marxism and communism were not cut unequivocally’ (Racz, 1991: 114). This separation had occurred to a large extent by 1993, though some still question whether the transformation is complete (Oltay, 1994a: 26). The same situation can be observed in Poland, where the ex-communist Alliance of the Democratic Left has tried to retool itself along the lines of European social democratic parties, and has apparently succeeded in doing so. In contrast, the Communist Party in the Czech Republic has neither changed its name nor undergone far-reaching internal reform (Ottaway, 1994). Thus, there are strong preferences for welfare state policies in East Central Europe, but these must be tapped with the appropriate rhetoric.¹⁸

As a final note concerning the role of economic perceptions in vote choice, Table 4 presents aggregate economic indicators and the percentage of vote

Table 4. Economic indicators and percentage of total vote won by all communist-successor parties in first two postcommunist parliamentary elections

<i>Country/Election</i>	<i>Unemployment rate (%)</i>	<i>Inflation rate (%)</i>	<i>Real GDP (% change over previous year)</i>	<i>Communist successors (% of vote)</i>
Poland				
1991	12.3	70.3	-7.0	22.06
1993	16.4	35.3	3.8	35.81
Hungary				
1990	1.9	28.9	-4.0	17.72
1994	10.4	18.8	2.0 ^a	35.09
Czech Republic				
1990	0.6	10.1	-1.3	20.58
1992	2.2	11.3	-6.4	23.17
Slovak Republic				
1990	1.0 ^b	10.0 ^b	-0.4 ^b	19.71
1992	10.4	9.1	-7.2 ^b	16.42

^a Estimate.

^b Data for Czechoslovakia.

Source: Economic data compiled from the following: *Magyar statisztikai zsebkönyv 1991* (1992); *Statisztikai Havi Közlemények '95/1* (1995); *Statistická ročenka České republiky '93* (1993); Winiecki (1994); *Wstępna ocena sytuacji społeczno-gospodarczej w 1994 roku* (1995).

won by all communist-successor parties during the first two freely competitive postcommunist elections. These data illustrate that if only the unemployment rate is taken into consideration, economic factors can explain this vote rather well. Unemployment in the Czech Republic has remained below 4 percent – a sharp contrast to the experiences of Poland and Hungary – and the Czech Republic has not seen a dramatic increase in support for ex-communist parties. Moreover, Czech prime minister Václav Klaus has relied on a hefty social safety net to maintain social stability (Slansky, 1995). On the other hand, although the unemployment rate rose much faster in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic, we do not see a corresponding rise in votes for the communist-successor parties. As mentioned earlier, this apparent anomaly can be explained by the fact that the ‘opposition-based’ Movement for a Democratic Slovakia campaigned in the 1992 elections for drastically slowing down the reform effort. Unlike in Poland, the non-communist – yet anti-reform – parties in the 1992 Czechoslovak elections attracted some of the vote in harder-hit areas (Pacek, 1994: 737).

The data show, however, that if either the inflation rate or change in GDP is compared with the communist-successor vote, this economic argument receives less support. One possible explanation for this is Przeworski’s (1993: 180–1) argument that the ‘fear of unemployment overwhelms all other considerations’, such that price instability and general economic contraction pale in significance. Another explanation is that strategies pursued by party elites substantially affect political outcomes. In the run-up to the 1991 campaign in Poland, for example, the ‘splits, mergers, changes of name and conflicts among the Solidarity parties, coupled with ... attempts to appeal to all sections to the electorate’ contributed to electoral results that were widely perceived to be a blow to Solidarity and its heirs (Millard, 1992: 850). This shift from Solidarity-based opposition parties to the communist-successor party, Alliance of the Democratic Left, was accentuated in the second round of elections such that it signalled the end of the Solidarity era; this is explained in part by public frustration with the fractious parliament, political infighting among the opposition, and the desire to return experienced and moderate politicians to the government (on this last point, see Michnik, 1994). Moreover, Solidarity’s anti-party reaction to the experience of communist rule meant that its splinter groups did not elaborate a clear programmatic self-definition nor institutionalize their support financially or with membership and territorial networks (Lewis, 1994: 785, 796; Zubeck, 1994: 822).

In contrast, Poland’s postcommunist parties utilized their inherited organizational and financial resources well, strengthened links to a well-organized trade union movement, and made a ‘smart, effective and relatively attractive showing’ on television (Lewis, 1994: 796–7). Similarly, although the Hungarian Socialist Party was weak in mass contacts and territorial organization in 1990 (Racz, 1993: 651), it overcame these inadequacies in 1994. One reason for this turnaround in its electoral fortunes might be its

advantageous position vis-a-vis the print media, which was only facilitated by the skepticism of many columnists toward the inexperienced legislators of the first postcommunist regime (Tökés, 1992: 169). Another reason is that it 'has been able to contain internal party debates and project the image of a smoothly functioning, professional party', in contrast to the 'quarrelsome' image projected by the other major parties (Oltay, 1994a: 21; see also Musatov, 1994: 47). In the Czech Republic, the situation is quite the opposite as the Communist Party is weak and 'badly fragmented, with its legislators split into three factions' (Ottaway, 1994). By contrast, part of the continuing strength of Václav Klaus's opposition-based Civic Democratic Party in the Czech Republic has been attributed to Klaus's efforts at creating social consensus and garnering strong public support for the transition program (Winiecki, 1994: 715; Slansky, 1995).

Thus, elite decisions regarding the course and implementation of economic reform as well as party organization and mobilization have shaped the development of party systems in East Central Europe in significant ways.

Conclusions

This paper finds that emerging party systems in postcommunist societies exhibit potentially important differences from the West and South European redemocratization experiences.

First, the general comparison between the pre- and post-authoritarian periods suggests that although some historical continuity is present, prior political cleavages did not simply 'unfreeze' after a period of dormancy. Most parties in the early post-transition phase did not crystallize around sharply defined social structures but resembled broad-based, fluid groupings; moreover, those traditional cleavages that did exist were organized around the existing societal fabric. Most telling, Czechoslovakia had the longest and most stable democratic experience of the three cases examined and yet it does not exhibit substantially higher levels of continuity than do Poland or Hungary. This runs counter to Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) speculations (supported by empirical evidence on previous redemocratizations) that an extended period of pre-authoritarian democratic rule should make the re-emergence of traditional political alignments more probable.

Therefore, these preliminary findings suggest that the large-scale changes that accompanied communist rule – including the replacement of elites, economic centralization, repression, attempts to destroy traditional civic and political institutions, and the creation of state-sponsored political bodies – have significantly affected historical political cleavages, at least in the early postcommunist period. They also call for more research such as Geddes's (1995) and Remmer's (1985), which attempts to identify precisely what elements common to communist *and* non-communist forms of authoritarian rule are the most debilitating to civil and political society.¹⁹

Second, in contrast to Spain and Portugal, the type of transition – whether by reform or by *ruptura* – had no significant marginal effect on initial public support for regime-successor parties. The first postcommunist parliamentary elections show fairly even support for communist-successor parties across the cases, whereas in the second round, ex-communist parties made impressive gains in Poland and Hungary but not in Czechoslovakia. In contrast to other post-authoritarian situations, formerly communist states tend to exhibit an initially high level of disenchantment with the previous regime that results in strong electoral victories for the opposition, regardless of transition mode. However, this groundswell of support for anti-communist parties is unstable, as electoral politics are being recreated on a shifting and turbulent playing field. Here, in this politically open space, elite decisions and policy choices have a magnified impact on political outcomes: dissatisfaction with choices about economic reform take root among the social welfare constituencies bred by the communist period and strategic choices concerning party organization, mobilization, and outreach greatly affect party alignments. Both factors help to explain the different fates of communist-successor parties in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Although it is still too early to say for certain, it appears that the legacies of the pre-authoritarian period and transition mode have not been as influential in determining the initial shape of party systems in East Central Europe as they were in Western and Southern Europe. Rather, it is the legacy of the communist authoritarian period – the command economy, the decomposition of civil society and the imposition of one-party rule – that seems to have the greatest effect on the early stages of party formation. To the extent that other non-communist authoritarian periods exhibit these features, we can expect to see similarities. On the whole, however, the political reconstruction of postcommunist East Central Europe may well proceed differently from that of other post-authoritarian states, especially those in Western and Southern Europe.

Notes

This research was assisted by a grant from the Joint Committee on the Soviet Union and its Successor States of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies with funds provided by the US State Department under the Soviet and East European Training Act of 1983. I would like to thank James Clem, Edward Gibson, John Huber, Michael McFaul, David Rivera and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on the paper, as well as Samuel Eldersveld, Dariusz Filar and Ryan Hudson for their critiques of an earlier draft. Of course, any errors of fact or interpretation are mine alone.

- 1 In a similar manner, the Soviet bloc is viewed as a set of important cases for testing the durability of political culture (Brown and Gray, 1977).
- 2 See Karl (1990) for an important article on how the mode of regime transition shapes the type of democracy that emerges in a post-authoritarian state.

- 3 Bermeo defines transition elections as the first national state electoral contests after the restoration of political freedom, i.e. in the redemocratized state. In Olson's (1993a) terminology, these are 'founding elections'.
- 4 Note, though, that in a later article Bermeo (1994) points out that Spain's elite-led transition resulted in credibility problems for the center-right party (UCD) that won the first post-authoritarian elections. Because of its association with the dictatorship and lack of legitimacy with organized labor, it was constrained in its ability to implement economic reforms and eventually lost to the socialists in 1982. This is a good example of why the democratic transition and consolidation phases should be regarded as analytically distinct, where the transition phase is a delimited period, i.e. the interval between one political regime and another. Democratic consolidation, on the other hand, is a longer process which ends when the basic rules of the 'democratic game' are no longer open to question (Mainwaring, 1992: 295, 330–1).
- 5 See McGregor (1993) for a good discussion of the effect of electoral laws on the parliaments of East Central Europe.
- 6 Lybeck (1985) finds fault with both methods and concludes that the Lipset and Rokkan hypothesis cannot be adequately tested.
- 7 This is in contrast to much of Latin America, where authoritarian rule did not automatically entail the dissolution of the pre-existing party system and the creation of regime-sponsored parties. In fact, Remmer predicts a high degree of discontinuity in post-authoritarian Brazil precisely because the military regime 'dispersed party activists, undermined organizational networks, and . . . [formed] semidemocratic institutions and a regime-supported political party' (1985: 271). The effect of the government's creation of a new party system is stressed by Geddes (1995).
- 8 There is a good deal of conceptual ambiguity about how a 'cleavage' is defined. I define a 'political cleavage' as an extensive (in terms of membership size) and persistent political division (Zuckerman, 1975: 236), which can be but is not necessarily linked to a specific social division. 'Social cleavages' are taken to mean deep conflict-producing divides between social groups.
- 9 More clericalist than the National Democratic Party was its frequent ally, the Christian Democrats.
- 10 This earlier appearance of a reform–anti-reform division in Poland than in the other two cases is due to the fact that the first fully competitive elections were held after large-scale economic reform had begun. Similarly, the regime–anti-regime axis evident in Hungary's and Czechoslovakia's founding elections had already emerged in Poland with Solidarity's overwhelming victory in the semi-competitive 1989 Polish elections. Thus a similar pattern is observed in all three countries, even though the time frame differs slightly.
- 11 Note, though, that this regime–anti-regime nexus did not take the form of a broad, anti-communist umbrella movement as it had in Poland (in 1989) and Czechoslovakia; rather, the opposition was divided and lacked a single, unifying charismatic leader such as Václav Havel (Körösényi, 1990: 337–8).
- 12 However, many of the current issues in East Central Europe have been infused with meaning from the communist period (e.g. whereas 'land reform' traditionally meant wresting control from large landowners, in 1989 it signified the de-collectivization of state-run agriculture).
- 13 As Bunce and Csanádi (1993: 266) argue with respect to East Central Europe:

If the economy and therefore the social system is in considerable flux and if the institutions connecting one government to another government are weak and if, at the same time, publics have been mobilized into politics, then the usual bases for political identity and for political activity are missing – for example, class and functionally based interest groups and thus unions and parties based on them. What this leaves, of course, is religion and ethnicity.

- 14 Omitted from my analysis, however, are at least three ways in which historical influences might shape party systems. First, the aggregate electoral data used in the paper do not permit the detection of regional continuities in party support. For example, historical continuity in regional voting patterns has been observed in both the Czech lands and Slovakia (Jehlička et al., 1993). Second, if founding elections and the first two elections thereafter do not reflect the real cleavages that will characterize the polity in normal times (Bogdanor, 1990), then historical continuities might not be immediately evident. However, for an argument *against* the exceptionalism of early post-authoritarian elections, see Turner (1993). And finally, the paper does not consider the role of symbolism and collective memory in the elections. For example, the leaders of Civic Forum ‘derived their politics from the tradition of the pre-war republic’, particularly from the ideas of the first president of Czechoslovakia, T.G. Masaryk (Jehlička et al., 1993: 249).
- 15 In contrast to Geddes (1995) and Jehlička et al. (1993), I count satellite parties in Poland and Czechoslovakia (i.e. pre-existing parties that were not disbanded but rather coopted as ‘allies’ of the ruling communist party during the communist takeover) as communist-successor rather than historic parties. In Czechoslovakia, all of the former satellites tried to distance themselves from the Communist Party in 1989, several by completely replacing their old leadership. However, in the case of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party at least, its collaboration with and subordination to the communists from 1948 to 1989 did in fact have some negative association for the public (Wightman, 1991a: 110). Although the Polish Peasant Party has been trying to cast itself as carrying on the tradition of Witos and Mikołajczyk, its communist heritage is emphasized in almost all accounts. Most often it is referred to as the ‘successor to a communist-era organization’, i.e. the United Peasant Party (Millard, 1992; Vinton, 1993; Tworzecki, 1994). I code the social democratic parties in Hungary and Czechoslovakia – which were forcibly merged with their respective communist parties in 1948 – as historic parties.
- 16 Since the key criterion is the organizational origin of the party, I disregard individual affiliations (e.g. former communists in ‘opposition-based’ parties) and the programmatic orientations of the parties.
- 17 This pattern holds true even if one excludes the satellite parties and then considers only the leading successor to the communist party in each country.
- 18 This ‘marketization’ axis is laid out well by Kitschelt (1992). Note, however, that my emphasis on the socio-economic dimension may be a function of the three countries chosen for analysis (see Evans and Whitefield, 1993).
- 19 Also see Mainwaring’s (1988) article which resists the attempt to group all Latin American party systems together and critically discusses important contrasts among them and the historical reasons for such differences.

Appendix: Election Results

Table A1. Poland: parliamentary elections – inter-war period (elections to Sejm)
(% of total vote; no. of seats in parentheses)^a

<i>Party</i>	<i>1919^b</i>	<i>1922</i>	<i>1928</i>	<i>1930</i>
Monarchist			0.5 (0)	
National Democrat	42.3 (141)	(126)	8.2 (37)	12.7 (63)
Christian Democrat		29.1 (43)	(19)	3.8 (14)
Piast	8.1 (89)	13.7 (70)	8.0 (21)	(15)
National Labor	3.7 (25)	5.4 (18)	2.0 (14)	17.3 ^c (10)
Wyzwolenie (Liberation)	18.5 (36)	13.0 (51)	(40)	(15)
Stronnictwo Chłopskie			14.7 (26)	(18)
Socialist	9.2 (36)	10.3 (41)	13.1 (65)	(24)
Populist-Bourgeois		3.3 (0)		
Populist Federation	4.3 (45)			
Communist		1.4 (2)	2.3 (7)	2.1 (4)
Communist 'Front'				0.2 (1)
Other Left			1.0 (8)	
Progressive Democrat	0.5 (0)			
National minorities:				15.1 (33)
German lists	2.7 (7)			
Jewish lists	9.1 (11)			
Separate lists		1.1 (0)	7.0 (19)	
Joint list		20.5 (89)	18.7 (65)	
State list for <i>kresy</i>		1.0 (0)		
BBWR ^d et al.			24.0 (122)	47.4 (247)
Other	1.6 (42)	1.2 (4)	0.5 (1)	1.4 (0)
Total	100.0 (432)	100.0 (444)	100.0 (444)	100.0 (444)

^a All opposition parties boycotted the 1935 and 1938 elections; data not available; ^b The 1919 elections were to a constituent assembly; ^c Figures for individual parties not available; ^d Non-partisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government.

Source: Rothschild (1974: 46–65).

EMERGING PARTY SYSTEMS IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE

Table A2. Poland: parliamentary elections – postcommunist period (elections to Sejm) (% of total vote)^a

Type	Party	1991 ^b	1993
Opposition	Democratic Union	12.31 (62)	10.59 (74)
Successor	Alliance of the Democratic Left	11.98 (60)	20.41 (171)
Opposition	Catholic Election Action ^c	8.73 (49)	6.37 (0)
Opposition	Citizen's Centrum Alliance	8.71 (44)	4.42 (0)
Successor	Polish Peasant Party-Programmatic Alliance (PSL) ^d	8.67 (48)	15.40 (132)
Opposition	Confederation for an Independent Poland	7.50 (46)	5.77 (22)
Opposition	Liberal Democratic Congress	7.48 (37)	3.99 (0)
Opposition/ Historic	Peasant Accord (PL)	5.46 (28)	2.37 (0)
Opposition	Solidarity	5.05 (27)	4.90 (0)
New	Polish Party of Beer Lovers	3.27 (16)	
	German Minority	1.17 (7)	0.71 (4)
New	Christian Democracy	2.36 (5)	
	Polish Western Union	0.23 (4)	
Opposition	Party of Christian Democrats	1.11 (4)	
Opposition	Union of Labour ^e	2.05 (4)	7.28 (41)
Opposition	Union of Political Realism	2.25 (3)	3.18 (0)
New	Party 'X'	0.47 (3)	2.74 (0)
	Movement for Silesian Autonomy	0.35 (2)	
Successor	Democratic Party	1.41 (1)	
Opposition	Democratic-Social Movement	0.46 (1)	
	Union of Wielkopolska	0.08 (1)	
	Peasant Unity	0.17 (1)	
	For Wielkopolska and Poland	0.21 (1)	
	Solidarity-80	0.11 (1)	
	Piast Peasant Election Alliance (PL and PSL)	0.37 (1)	
	Electoral Committee of Orthodox Believers	0.12 (1)	
	Krakow Coalition of Solidarity with the President	0.25 (1)	
	Union of Podhale	0.24 (1)	
	Alliance of Women against Life's Hardships	0.02 (1)	
Opposition	Nonparty Bloc to Support Reform		5.41 (16)
	Self-Defense		2.78 (0)
	Coalition for the Republic		2.70 (0)
	Other	1.81	0.98
	Invalid	5.60	
	Total	100.00 (460)	100.00 (460)

^a No. of seats in parentheses.

^b There were elections held in 1989, but since only 35% of the seats in the Sejm were freely contested, these results are not presented. Solidarity won all 161 of the seats it was allowed to contest.

^c The major force behind this alliance is the Christian National Union. This was renamed the 'Fatherland' Catholic Election Committee in 1993.

^d The Polish Peasant Party (PSL) resulted from the 1990 merger of the successor to the communist satellite, the United Peasant Party, and a second PSL, drawing on the traditions of Witos's inter-war peasant party and the immediate post-war party of Mikołajczyk. However, in 1991, this coalition broke down and two electoral alliances formed: the Polish Peasant Party-Programmatic Alliance (PSL), consisting primarily of remnants of the communist-era United Peasant Party, and the Peasant Accord (PL) – comprised in part of the historic peasant party and in part of the Solidarity peasant movement.

^e Originally named Labour Solidarity.

Sources: 'Bulletin of Electoral Statistics and Public Opinion Research Data' (1993); Millard (1992); Sanford (1991); Vinton (1993); Webb (1992).

Table A3. Hungary: parliamentary elections – inter-war and immediate post-war period (elections to National Assembly or Képviselő Ház) (% of total vote)^a

Party	1920	1922	1926	1931	1935	1939	1945
Arrow Cross parties	–	–	–	–	n.a. ^b (2)	n.a. (45) ^c	–
Government Party	–	n.a. (143)	n.a. (171)	n.a. (152)	n.a. (170)	n.a. (179)	–
Hungarian Communist Party ^d	–	–	–	–	–	–	n.a. (70)
Hungarian Social Democratic Party	–	n.a. (25)	n.a. (14)	n.a. (14)	n.a. (11)	n.a. (5)	n.a. (69)
Independent Smallholders' Party ^e	n.a. (71)	–	–	n.a. (14)	n.a. (24)	n.a. (14)	n.a. (245)
Independent Democrats	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
National Liberal Party	–	–	–	n.a. (5)	n.a. (7)	n.a. (5)	n.a. (0)
National Peasant Party	–	–	–	–	–	–	n.a. (23)
Radical Party	–	–	–	–	–	–	n.a. (0)
Wolff and Zichy Party ^f	n.a. (68)	n.a. (20)	n.a. (35)	n.a. (30)	n.a. (14)	n.a. (8)	n.a. (2)
Czechoslovak representatives	–	–	–	–	–	n.a. (36)	–
Independents	n.a. (3)	n.a. (35)	n.a. (7)	n.a. (25)	n.a. (11)	n.a. (1)	n.a. (0)
Other	n.a. (22)	n.a. (22)	n.a. (18)	n.a. (5)	n.a. (6)	n.a. (3)	n.a. (0)
Total	n.a. (164)	n.a. (245)	n.a. (245)	n.a. (245)	n.a. (245)	n.a. (296)	n.a. (409)

^a No. of seats in parentheses.

^b Data not available.

^c In 1939, this grouping included: the Arrow Cross (29 seats), the National Front (3), the National Socialist Front (5), the Christian National Socialist Front (3), the Party of the People's Will (1), and the Racialists (4).

^d Banned from 1919 to 1945.

^e A Smallholders' Party joined the Government Party in the early 1920s. A new Independent Smallholders' Party was formed in 1930.

^f Known under various formal names: in 1920, the Christian National Union Party; in 1922, the Wolff Party; in 1926, the Christian National Economic Party; in 1931 and 1935, the Christian Social Economic Party; in 1939, the United Christian Party; and in 1945, the Democratic People's Party.

Source: McHale (1983: 488–514).

Table A4. Hungary: parliamentary elections – postcommunist period (elections to Parliament – unicameral) (% of total vote)^a

Type	Party	1990	1994
Opposition	Hungarian Democratic Forum	24.71 (165)	11.74 (38)
Opposition	Alliance of Free Democrats	21.38 (91)	19.74 (69)
Historic	Independent Smallholders' and Citizens' Party	11.76 (44)	8.82 (26)
Successor	Hungarian Socialist Party ^b	10.89 (33)	32.99 (209)
Opposition	Alliance of Young Democrats	8.94 (21)	7.02 (20)
Historic	Christian Democratic People's Party ^c	6.46 (21)	7.03 (22)
Successor	Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party	3.68 (0)	
Successor	Agrarian Alliance	3.15 (1)	2.10 (2)
Historic	Hungarian Social Democratic Party ^d	3.55 (0)	
	Patriotic Election Coalition	1.87 (0)	
New	Entrepreneurs' Party	1.89 (0)	
Historic	Hungarian People's Party ^e	0.76 (0)	
	Independent	(6)	
	Joint candidate	(4)	
	Other	0.96	10.56
	Total	100.00 (386)	100.00 (386)

^a The vote percentages are for the territorial list voting. The number of seats (in parentheses) represents the total number of seats won: in single-member districts, on territorial lists, and on the national list.

^b The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party changed its name to the Hungarian Socialist Party in October 1989. There was also a remnant of the former which refused to go along with this change of name and orientation.

^c It claims descent from the Democratic People's Party that existed between 1944 and 1948.

^d The Social Democratic Party was forced to merge with the communists in 1948.

^e This party sees itself as a continuation of the National Peasant Party, established in 1944, which operated under the name Petöfi Party in 1956.

Sources: 'Bulletin of Electoral Statistics and Public Opinion Research Data' (1993); Hibbing and Patterson (1992); Körösenyi (1990); Oltay (1994b); Racz (1991); Racz and Kukorelli (1995); Swain (1991).

Table A5. Czechoslovakia: parliamentary elections – inter-war and immediate post-war period (elections to Chamber of Deputies) (% of total vote)^a

<i>Party</i>	1920	1925	1929	1935	1946 ^b
Czechoslovak Social Democrat	25.7 (74)	8.9 (29)	13.0 (39)	12.6 (38)	(37)
Czech and Slovak Populist ^c	11.3 (33)				
Czechoslovak Agrarian		13.7 (45)	15.0 (46)	14.3 (45)	(0)
Czech Populist (People's)		9.7 (31)	8.4 (25)	7.5 (22)	(46)
Czech Agrarian ^d	9.7 (28)				
Slovak Agrarian	3.9 (12)				
Czech National Socialist	8.1 (24)	8.6 (28)	10.4 (32)	9.2 (28)	(55)
Czech National Democrat	6.2 (19)	4.0 (13)	4.9 (15)	5.6 ^e (17)	(0)
Czech Small Trader	2.0 (6)	4.0 (13)	3.9 (12)	5.4 (17)	
Czech Progressive Socialist	0.9 (3)				
Czech Fascist				2.0 (6)	
Slovak Populist (People's)		6.9 (23)	5.7 (19)	6.9 ^f (22)	(48)
Communist ^g		13.2 (41)	10.2 (30)	10.3 (30)	(114)
Against Fixed-order Lists			1.0 (3)		
<i>Ethnic Minority Parties</i>					
German Social Democrat	11.1 (31)	5.8 (17)	6.9 (21)	3.6 (11)	(0)
German Nationalist & Nazi	5.3 (15)				
German Nationalist		3.4 (10)	2.5 (7)		
German Nazi		2.4 (7)	2.8 (8)	15.2 (44)	
German Farmer	3.9 (11)	8.0 ^h (24)	5.4 ⁱ (16)	1.7 (5)	(0)
German Christian Social et al.	3.5 (10)	4.4 (13)	4.7 (14)	2.0 (6)	
German Democrat	1.7 (5)	–			
Magyar Christian Democrat	2.2 (5)	1.4 (4)	3.5 ⁱ (9)	3.5 (9)	
Magyar Social Democrat	1.8 (4)				
Magyar Agrarian	0.4 (1)				
Jewish–Polish bloc			1.4 (4)		
Jewish lists	1.3 (0)	1.6 (0)			
Polish list		0.4 (1)			
Ruthenian Autonomist		0.5 (1)			
Other	1.0 (0)	3.1 (0)	0.3 (0)	0.2 (0)	(5)
Total	100.0 (281)	100.0 (300)	100.0 (300)	100.0 (300)	(305)

^a No. of seats in parentheses.^b The 1946 elections were for a constituent national assembly. Several parties were banned and it was not possible to vote for any opposition party.^c Split into Czech Populists and Slovak Populists in 1921.^d The Czech Agrarian and Slovak Agrarian parties merged in 1922.^e Czech National Democrat and Fascist.^f Slovak Populist, Slovak National, Ruthenian Autonomist and Polish.^g Split off from the Social Democratic Party in 1920 and joined with Slovak and Sudeten German socialist left-wing factions to form the Communist Party in 1921.^h Includes both German and Magyar Farmer parties.ⁱ German Farmer and DAWG.^j Magyar Christian Social and Nationalist.*Sources:* McHale (1983: 154); Rothschild (1974: 102–26).

Table A6. Czech Republic: parliamentary elections – postcommunist period (elections to the House of the People, Federal Assembly) (% of total vote)^a

Type	Party	1990	1992
Opposition	Civic Forum	53.15 (68)	
Opposition	Civic Democratic Alliance		4.98
Historic	Czechoslovak Social Democracy ^b	3.84	7.67 (10)
Opposition	Civic Democratic Party/Christian Democratic Party		33.90 (48)
Opposition	Civic Movement		4.39
Successor	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia	13.48 (15)	
Successor	Left Bloc		14.27 (19)
Successor/ Opposition	Christian & Democratic Union ^c	8.69 (9)	5.98 (7)
New/Successor	Liberal Social Union ^d		5.84 (7)
New	Republican Party–Association for the Republic		6.48 (8)
New	Movement for Self-Governing Democracy–Society for Moravia & Silesia	7.89 (9)	4.23
	Alliance of Farmers and the Countryside	3.77	
New	Green Party	3.10	
New	Coexistence	0.08	
Successor	Czechoslovak Socialist Party	2.75	
	Democratic–Republican Coalition	0.94	
New	Free Bloc	0.80	
New	Interest Associations in the Czech Republic	0.66	
	Czechoslovak Democratic Forum	0.32	
	Movement for Civic Freedom	0.30	
New	Movement for Czech Understanding	0.11	
New	Friends of Beer Party	0.12	
	Other		12.26
	Total	100.00 (101)	100.00 (99)

^a No. of seats in parentheses.

^b The Social Democrats were forcibly united with the communists in 1948. In 1992 Czechoslovak Social Democracy split into the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia and the Czech Social Democratic Party.

^c This comprised the Czechoslovak People's Party (communist satellite), the Christian Democratic Party (a non-denominational Christian party which traced its origins to dissenting religious circles), and, nominally, the Christian Democratic Movement in Slovakia in 1990. In 1992 the Christian Democratic Party ended its association with the coalition and the latter was renamed the Christian Democratic Union. Thus it is counted only as a successor party in 1992.

^d This was formed in autumn 1991 by the Green Party, the Czechoslovak Socialist Party (former satellite) and the Agricultural Party.

Sources: 'Bulletin of Electoral Statistics and Public Opinion Research Data' (1993); Olson (1993b); Pehe (1992); Wightman (1990, 1991a, 1991b).

Table A7. Slovak Republic: parliamentary elections – postcommunist period (elections to the House of the People, Federal Assembly) (% of total vote)^a

<i>Type</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1992^b</i>
Opposition	Public Against Violence	32.54 (19)	
Opposition	Movement for a Democratic Slovakia		33.53 (24)
Opposition	Civic Democratic Union–Public Against Violence		3.96
Opposition	Christian Democratic Movement	18.96 (11)	8.96 (6)
Successor	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia	13.81 (8)	
Successor	Party of the Democratic Left		14.44 (10)
Historic	Social Democratic Party of Slovakia	1.89	4.86
Successor/ Opposition	Democratic Party–Civic Democratic Party ^c	4.40	3.95
New	Slovak National Party	10.96 (6)	9.39 (6)
New	Coexistence, Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement	8.58 (5)	7.37 (5)
Opposition	Slovak Christian Democratic Movement		3.45
	Alliance of Farmers and the Countryside	2.58	
New	Green Party	3.20	
Successor	Czechoslovak Socialist Party	0.06	
	Democratic–Republican Coalition	0.25	
New	Free Bloc	0.18	
Successor	Freedom Party	1.44	
	Czechoslovak Democratic Forum	0.02	
	Gypsies	0.67	
	Movement for Civic Freedom	0.02	
New	Movement for Czechoslovak Understanding	0.41	
	Other	0.03	10.09
	Total	100.00 (49)	100.00 (51)

^a No. of seats in parentheses.

^b There were also elections in autumn 1994, the results of which are not presented here.

^c The Democratic Party was the former communist satellite party, the Party of Slovak Renewal, which was renamed in December 1989. For the 1992 elections, it joined with the Civic Democratic Party, which had emerged from the Civic Forum. Thus in 1990 it is counted as a successor party only.

Sources: 'Bulletin of Electoral Statistics and Public Opinion Research Data' (1993); Olson (1993b); Pehe (1992); Wightman (1990, 1991a, 1991b).

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Paper submitted 10 April 1995; accepted for publication 15 October 1995.