The Militarization of the Russian Elite under Putin
What We Know, What We Think We Know (but Don’t), and What We Need to Know

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This article reviews the vast literature on Russia’s transformation into a “militocracy”—a state in which individuals with career experience in Russia’s various force structures occupy important positions throughout the polity and economy—during the reign of former KGB lieutenant colonel Vladimir Putin. We show that (1) elite militarization has been extensively utilized both to describe and explain core features of Russian foreign and domestic policy; and (2) notwithstanding its widespread usage, the militocracy framework rests on a rather thin, and in some cases flawed, body of empirical research. We close by discussing the remaining research agenda on this subject and listing several alternative theoretical frameworks to which journalists and policymakers arguably should pay equal or greater attention.

I was an officer for almost twenty years. And this is my own milieu…. I relate to individuals from the security organs, from the Ministry of Defense, or from the special services as if I were a member of this collective. —Vladimir Putin (“Dovol’stvie voennykh vyrastet v razy” 2011)

In analyses of Russia since Vladimir Putin came to power at the start of the millennium, this master narrative has been replaced by an entirely different set of themes. One such theme is Putin’s successful campaign to remove the oligarchs from high politics (via prison sentences, if necessary) and renationalize key components of the natural resource sector. A second and even more dominant theme revolves around the Kremlin’s steady reversal of the democratic achievements of the late 1980s and early 1990s and its re-creation of a centralized authoritarian regime. In place of the decentralization and “anarchy” of the Yeltsin years, Putin has created what Russians call a “vertical of power.” A third theme that emerged in academic and media coverage of post-Yeltsin Russia, especially during Putin’s second presidential term, is Moscow’s confident assertiveness—even combative action—on the world stage, especially vis-à-vis the United States. This combative action recently reached its apogee with Russia’s de facto invasion of Ukraine over American protests and in the face of American and European sanctions.

In the 1990s, scholarly and journalistic analyses of Russia were largely dominated by three interconnected themes: an economy in steep decline and marked by widespread poverty and suffering; an epidemic of corruption, organized crime, and mafia-like violence; and, in the second half of the decade, the domination of political life by a group of capitalist tycoons collectively known as the “oligarchs.” The dominant framework for understanding these developments was that of a mismanaged transition from communism. While opinions differed over whether Russia’s difficulties resulted from Moscow’s inconsistent and half-hearted implementation of the reform program recommended by Western governments and international financial institutions or, conversely, from the inherent flaws of the “Washington Consensus” of rapid marketization, privatization of industry, and macroeconomic stabilization, almost all agreed that Russia’s post-communist trajectory contained more mistakes and setbacks than triumphs and advances.
lieutenant colonel Putin came into office determined to reestablish Moscow’s authority throughout the far-flung Russian Federation and, more generally, to increase the state’s control over a society perceived to be descending into chaos. In order to accomplish these objectives, the president needed loyal operatives who would follow orders and not hesitate to violate either the law or democratic practice, if necessary. For this reason, Putin methodically appointed scores of fellow siloviki (as such individuals are called) to important positions throughout the polity and economy. The end result has been Russia’s transformation into what The Economist (“The Making of a Neo-KGB State: Russia under Putin” 2007) calls a “neo-KGB state” and the Russian sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya terms a “militocracy” (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2003).2

This article provides a comprehensive review of both this framework—which we shall call the “militocracy paradigm”—and existing critiques of the conclusions reached by it. In it we show that, on the one hand, the militocracy paradigm has dominated discussion about Putin-era Russia in the public sphere to a greater extent, it seems, than has any other theoretical approach. Among other purposes, the militocracy concept has been used to conceptualize the protagonists in Russia’s presidential elections, identify a dominant faction in Kremlin decision-making, describe the essence of Putin’s personnel policies, and characterize changes in the composition of the business elite. In addition, Putin’s KGB past and his purposeful militarization of the elite have been utilized to explain central aspects of Russian foreign and domestic policy, such as heightened authoritarianism, conflict in U.S.–Russian relations, Russia’s military aggression against Georgia and Ukraine, and economic mismanagement.

On the other hand, this article also demonstrates that, notwithstanding its widespread usage by journalists and policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic, the militocracy paradigm rests on a rather thin, and in some cases flawed, body of systematic empirical research. In this regard, its explanatory power is more asserted than demonstrated. In addition, careful scrutiny of existing findings reveals that the actual proportion of Russia’s rulers drawn from the military and security services has been much smaller than is generally assumed. Whereas that proportion has been widely reported in both scholarship and the media to be roughly one-quarter during Putin’s first presidential term and to have reached two-fifths by the end of his second term in office, existing research actually indicates that the share of siloviki in the political elite was only around one-seventh in 2002 and peaked at one-fifth in 2008. In sum, a large amount of thinking about Putin-era Russia has been operating on the basis of assumptions that are either unproven or incorrect.

This article has the following four components. First, we discuss the four main ways in which journalists, policymakers, and scholars have employed the militocracy paradigm to describe the political and economic evolution of Putin-era Russia. Second, we discuss three ways in which elite militarization has been used to explain both the Kremlin’s foreign and domestic policies and trends in Russia’s economic development. Third, we survey the relatively small body of existing research that questions the validity of core components of the militocracy paradigm. And fourth, we summarize the state of existing knowledge about militarization in Russia, discuss what we consider to be the most important components of the remaining research agenda on this topic, and list several alternative theoretical frameworks to which journalists and policymakers arguably should pay equal or greater attention.

DESCRIPTIVE USES OF THE MILITOCRACY PARADIGM

Conceptualizing Russia’s Presidential Elections and Infighting in the Kremlin

Vladimir Putin served for over a decade as a KGB officer before becoming an assistant to Anatoly Sobchak, chairman of the Leningrad City Council, in 1990, and eventually deputy mayor of St. Petersburg under Sobchak until 1996. In addition, after serving in the Presidential Administration under Boris Yeltsin and prior to his appointment to the post of prime minister in August 1999, Putin spent a year as head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the main successor to the KGB. Soon after his election to the presidency in 2000, analysts began to use his career history to frame his rise to power. One of the first to do so was former major general Oleg Kalugin, the head of the KGB’s Foreign Counterintelligence Directorate from 1973 to 1979. In a speech delivered in November 2000, he colorfully describes Putin’s election to the presidency as the “triumph of the KGB” (Kalugin 2000).

“And now comes the irony of history,” he states. “The ‘armed vanguard’ of the Communist Party, the servant of the party apparatus—the KGB—defeats the Communists, and moves triumphantly into the Kremlin!” This conceptual frame of the KGB-versus-the Communists was still in use twelve years later. Describing Putin’s first-round victory in the presidential election of 2012 and the Communist candidate’s second-place finish, Alexander Boot (2012) writes: “So yet again the KGB and the Party have reenacted their perennial struggles for power. Yet again the KGB won, as it has done consistently since 1982, when its chairman Yuri Andropov took over the country and paved the way for his beloved apostle Mikhail Gorbachev.” An even more common use of the militocracy concept has been to delineate a major faction within the country’s top leadership. In some analyses, the groupings competing for power are identified as two in number; in others, more are purported to exist. However, the siloviki are always seen to be one of them. Moreover, they have generally been identified as the dominant faction since early in Putin’s rule. For instance, Anders Aslund (2007, 240) identifies the two main sets of actors on the stage of Russian politics...
during Putin’s first presidential term as siloviki and oligarchs. In this analysis, Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s arrest and the state’s unlawful seizure of his oil company, Yukos, marked the culmination of their struggle for influence: “Putin’s KGB officers had won over the oligarchs.” William Safire (2003) begins an op-ed about Khodorkovsky’s arrest with the following sentence: “Russia today is ruled by Vladimir Putin’s siloviki, former KGB men and military officers who have the nation by the throat.” In an in-depth analysis of the networks involved in Kremlin decision-making, Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White (2005) also identify two “clans” of officials interacting with the president: siloviki and liberals. In his recent biography of Russia’s president, Steven Lee Myers (2015, 228 and 249) similarly divides “the camps in Putin’s Kremlin” into the “economists and academics who pushed to open markets and the siloviki . . . who favored strengthening the state’s grip on society, business, and politics.”

Depictions of Kremlin politics in these terms continued to be advanced even after Putin had moved to the post of prime minister in 2008 and Dmitry Medvedev, a civilian lawyer by background, had taken his place as president.3 Policymakers were sometimes even more categorical. For instance, speaking to French leaders on the (mistaken) assumption of confidentiality, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated: “Russian democracy has disappeared, and the government is an oligarchy run by the security services” (quoted in Carvajal 2010).

As Putin assembled his cabinet for his third and current presidential term that began in 2012, factional analysis of this kind still dominated interpretations of Kremlin politics. For instance, Tim Wall (2012), then editor-in-chief of The Moscow News, predicted that “Vladimir Putin’s new administration is more likely to see the coming to power not of a new tandem, but a new troika. This troika will represent the three main centers of power and influence in the elite—oil, finance capital and the siloviki . . . . As the guarantor of siloviki influence, Putin will remain the ultimate arbiter in Russian politics.” Somewhat in contrast, an article published by Stratfor.com divides the leadership into two clans—siloviki and “civiliki,” civilian lawyers and economists who owe their rise to power to President Medvedev—and then proceeds to explain the latter’s impending appointment as prime minister as a means “to keep the siloviki at bay while rebuilding a power base for the civiliki” (Kolesnikova 2012).4 However, Lilia Shevtsova’s (2012, 253) analysis of Putin’s current administration contains no room for any other factions at all. “It is a praetorian regime run by people from the secret services—indeed, from these services’ most archaic provincial level,” she writes. “[F]or the first time in Russian history, people from these institutions have taken power in their own hands.”5

Staffing the State

The militocracy concept has also been used to describe the Kremlin’s appointments to leadership positions in Russia’s regions. In order to increase central control over the 89 subjects of the federation, Putin carried out a major overhaul of Russia’s federal system during his first year in office. Three features of this reform program stand out. First, Putin added a new administrative layer consisting of seven territorial “super-districts.” As Nikolai Petrov (2005, 10) notes, the configuration of these districts was based on “a military-police pattern—that of the okrugs of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troops.” Second, the Kremlin initially appointed siloviki—specifically, two army generals, two former KGB officers, and one MVD general—to head five of these seven districts; and five out of eight of Putin’s subsequent appointees similarly hailed from the power ministries. In other words, fully ten of the fifteen individuals who served as the president’s plenipotentiary representatives (polpredy) from May 2000 to May 2008 were siloviki (Taylor 2011, 130). Moreover, the polpredy in turn drew upon their pre-existing career networks to staff their offices to such an extent that more than one-third of the deputies and assistants to the original seven polpredy had power ministry backgrounds (Taylor 2011, Table 4.4).6 And third, the proportion of siloviki among the Main Federal Inspectors in the federal districts reached 45 percent (Taylor 2011, Table 4.4).7 In light of these developments, it is easy to understand why Alexander Golts and Tonya Putnam (2004, 150) commented at the end of Putin’s first term that “[v]irtually all of Putin’s major initiatives for reform of Russia’s state structure have been designed in line with the theory that the best way to govern a country such as Russia is by means of a strictly hierarchical, military-style command system.”

The two most prominent proponents of the militocracy paradigm, however, have argued that the militarization of political life has involved more than just the president’s representatives in the regions. Specifically, Kryshtanovskaya and White (2003, 289) begin their influential article “Putin’s Militocracy” with the assertion that, “[s]ince his victory in the 2000 presidential election, Vladimir Putin has drawn a stream of people in uniform into Russia’s power structures.” They support this claim with data on the backgrounds of the members of various state institutions at four different points in time—1988, 1993, 1999, and 2002. In particular, Kryshtanovskaya and White examine five sectors of Russian “officialdom,” which in 2002 consisted of: the 24 members of the Security Council; the 58 members of the Government; the chief executives of 88 of Russia’s regional subdivisions; 168 members of the Federation Council (Russia’s upper house of parliament); and 448 deputies of the State Duma (the lower house) as elected in 1999. After reporting the percentage of “military-security representatives” (presumably defined by previous employment) in each sector in each of the four aforementioned years, Kryshtanovskaya and White (2003, Table 2) average together the percentages of siloviki in each of the five sectors to produce an aggregate “average by cohort” of military-security representation that increases monotonically
from 3.7 percent in 1988 to 25.1 percent in 2002. The latter figure is the central finding of their article, one that is highlighted in its opening paragraph, which states: “At present every fourth member of the Russian elite has a military or security background, and their numbers are continuing to grow” (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2003, 289).

In 2009, Kryshtanovskaya and White (2009, Table 2) extended their demographic analyses of the Russian elite into both Putin’s second presidential term and the Medvedev presidency. Their more recent analyses reveal that military-security representation increased between 2002 (the middle of Putin’s first presidential term) and January 2008 (close to the end of his second) in each of the five sectors that they had previously examined. As in their previous article, they then average together the most recent percentages and report a figure of 32 percent military-security representation for the 2008 cohort as a whole. Moreover, later in the article they report a higher aggregate figure—42 percent—in February 2008 (303, and Tables 5 and 6). On the other hand, their data also show that military-security representation declined between February 2008 and September 2009 (i.e., over the course of the first year and a half of the Medvedev presidency) both on the Security Council and in the Government (Tables 6 and 7). Notwithstanding this downward trend under Medvedev, Kryshtanovskaya and White conclude their article with a resounding affirmation of their earlier thesis. “Russia’s entire history and the nature of the changes that have taken place since 2000 suggest that the defense and security complex will remain a central part of the regime and a key instrument of power,” they write. “[The siloviki have] never been more powerful, both in government and in the growing network of state corporations” (305).

Kryshtanovskaya and White’s findings have inspired numerous analysts to issue sweeping assertions regarding the takeover of the Russian state writ large by the Federal Security Service (FSB), successor to the KGB. For instance, Adrian Karatnycky (2003) asserts that “the takeover [of the government, parliament and regional leadership] by the militarocracy is nearly total.” After the Kremlin proposed legislation in 2008 radically expanding the definition of treason, Lev Ponomarev, the head of the Moscow-based group For Human Rights, commented: “The secret police de facto captured the government a long time ago. Now they want to capture it de jure” (quoted in Schwritz 2008). Victor Yassmann (2007) of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty similarly asserts: “Virtually all key positions in Russian political life—in government and the economy—are controlled by the so-called siloviki.”… Never in Russian or Soviet history has the political and economic influence of the security organs been as widespread as it is now.98

Even after Putin moved to the less powerful post of prime minister in 2008, analysts continued to describe the polity as a militarocracy. For instance, Lev Gudkov (2011, 33–34) writes: “Today the political police has become not so much a tool of the regime as the regime itself…. By bringing about the coercive but illegal or weakly legitimized redistribution of property, financial flows, and administrative influence and constituting a hidden part of the political leadership, the security services have turned into a substitute for the former planned regulation of the economy … and a surrogate personnel reserve for the regime.” At least one recent appointment by the State Duma dramatically illustrates that this source of personnel continues to function during Putin’s current presidential term: its selection (by a vote of 323 to 11) of Tat’iana Moskal’kova, a former major general in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as Russia’s Human Rights Commissioner. During the floor debate prior to the vote, party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky stated: “This mocks the post of a human rights ombudsman. Nowhere and nobody will nominate a former policeman to this post” (quoted in Nechepurenko 2016). As if to prove his point, immediately after the vote Moskal’kova (“Tat’iana Moskal’kova’ 2016) described her mandate as commissioner as follows: “Today the issue of human rights is actively used by certain Western and American institutions as a tool to blackmail, to create speculation about, to threaten, and to pressure Russia. The Human Rights Commissioner can and must work to counter the false and invalid accusations that are made against Russia.”

Moreover, the major “reshuffle” of administrative personnel at both the federal and regional levels that Putin undertook in July 2016—hirings and firings that involved four governships, the envos to three federal districts, and the head of a federal ministry—reflects, in the view of many, the president’s long-standing preference for entrusting the country’s governance to comrades in epaulettes.9 For instance, former State Duma deputy Dmitrii Gudkov reacted by stating, “I can’t remember a time when so many security service guys ascended to power at once…. [The Kremlin] can’t trust anyone but those in uniform” (quoted in Litvinova 2016).

The Militarization of the Business Elite

Yet another prominent use of the militarocracy framework has been to describe the means by which the state has reasserted control over various strategic (as well as highly profitable) sectors of the economy. For instance, Kryshtanovskaya and White (2003, 304 and 301) claim that Putin’s Kremlin inserted “agents of influence in business and the media” who fueled the creation of a “military-business complex.” “Since 2000,” writes Edward Lucas (2008, 20), “veterans of the Soviet intelligence and security services have taken control not only of the Kremlin and government, but also the media and the commanding heights of the economy.” Andrei Illarionov (2009, 70–71), Putin’s top economic adviser from 2000 to 2004, argues that “[w]ith the state as their base, the siloviki have taken over
key business and media organizations as well. There are now few areas of Russian life where [their] long arm fails to reach.” Daniel Treisman (2007, 142) goes even further by coining a new term to describe Russia’s political-economic system under Putin. The “oligarchs” of the 1990s, he writes, “have given way to a previously little-known cohort of executives, most from the network of security service and law enforcement veterans … who form the backbone of President Putin’s administration. … In short, industrial and financial capital has fused with secret police networks to produce a new political and economic order,” which he calls “silovarchy.”

Examples of this phenomenon are provided by the cases of Sergei Chemezov, who served with Putin in the KGB in East Germany and later became the head of Russia’s state-run arms exporting monopoly; Nikolai Tokarev, Putin’s superior officer in East Germany who became head of a state-owned oil firm in 2000 and then president of Transneft, Russia’s largest state-run oil pipeline company, in 2007; and Vladimir Strzhalkovskii, who was a colleague of Putin’s in the Leningrad branch of the KGB before being appointed chief executive of Norilsk Nickel in 2008 (Finn 2006; Bachman 2010; Kramer 2012). The oil industry provides the premier example of a hostile takeover accruing to the benefit of siloviki. As Yasmann (2007) points out, “[t]he primary beneficiary of the dismantling of Yukos was Rosneft—whose board is headed by deputy presidential chief of staff and silovik clan leader Igor Sechin.” Moreover, the expropriation of businesses (followed often by the imprisonment of their owners) by siloviki has been such a common practice that “police officers who seize businesses … have earned the nickname ‘werewolves in epaulets’” (Herszenhorn and Kramer 2013). Aware of this state of affairs, Putin proposed an amnesty in 2013 covering 13,000 of the country’s white-collar criminals. The president’s ombudsman for business who championed the plan commented that the first thirteen years of Putin’s reign were “not the best for defenders of property rights” (quoted in Herszenhorn and Kramer 2013).

EXEMPLARY USES OF THE MILITOCRACY PARADIGM: IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIA AND THE WORLD

Economic Mismanagement

As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, a multitude of scholars, journalists, and public figures believe that Putin’s tenure as leader of Russia has been accompanied by a massive influx of siloviki into elite positions, whether they be in the Kremlin, the legislative branch of the federal government, the executive offices and federal bureaucracy in Russia’s regions, or the country’s major corporations. Almost all of these voices also maintain that elite militarization has had significant—and mostly ominous—implications for both Russia’s evolution at home and its conduct abroad. One of those implications concerns the country’s economic development.

Specifically, many believe that the militarization of business has bred corporate mismanagement. For instance, Åslund (2008, 20) writes:

Since 2003 Putin’s KGB friends in high positions have started a massive renationalization of large privatized corporations. … These hungry secret policemen accept few limits, least of all the private property of others. They take over one big enterprise after another. Sooner or later, the squeezing out of good enterprises by bad ones will be reflected in the growth rate. The threat is that inefficient state giants will gobble up efficient private corporations and promote old-style over-regulation and corruption.

In the same vein, Michael Stuermer (2009, 74) warns that “[w]hen spies take over the political process, it is in a way their field of competence, but in the economy they can do a lot of damage. … What do they know about modernizing companies, developing markets, cooperating with partners abroad, managing ever scarcer human resources?” In an interview with Novaia gazeta, the late former deputy prime minister and opposition leader Boris Nemtsov concurs: “All the Yeltsin-era oligarchs have now become nothing more than owners of major business assets. … But that doesn’t mean there are no longer any oligarchs. … We used to have a private oligarchy, and now we have a chekist oligarchy. … [T]hey’re running giant monopolies as they please. That’s much worse for the economy” (quoted in Mulin 2006).

De-democratization

Even before Putin came to power, the consensus among experts on the USSR’s security services was that their agents were imbued with an anti-democratic and illiberal ethos. For instance, in her history of the Soviet KGB, Yevgenia Albats (1994, 221) concludes: “democracy in our country is not possible so long as the KGB, despite all the new slogans, continues to do its job—with the same methods, the same hands, the same brains, and the same mentality.” Amy Knight (1996, 245) similarly expresses the view that “[s]ecurity police have a vested interest in preserving the old, totalitarian, or authoritarian system.”

Taking their cue from this pre-existing literature, most analyses of the rise of the siloviki under Putin contend that their greatest impact has been on the form of the polity. For instance, Peter Baker and Susan Glasser (2005, 11) explain the “rollback of Russian democracy” primarily with reference to the “KGB tactics and mentality that Putin brought to the Kremlin.” Commenting on the exclusion of former prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov from Russia’s 2008 presidential contest on procedural technicalities, the editorial
board of The New York Times similarly references Putin’s KGB past: “Look into the eyes of Vladimir Putin … and what you see is a KGB-trained mind that apparently cannot tolerate leaving any detail of an election to chance” ("Kicking Democracy’s Corpse in Russia” 2008). After noting “a significant deterioration of fundamental rights and the emergence of an increasingly assertive foreign policy” over the course of 2003, Freedom House (2004) similarly attributes these developments to “the consolidation of power by former security and military officers.”

Russian analysts have issued even starker judgments. “[T]he advancement of former secret police officials to the first roles in the state is an ominous sign of the forthcoming restoration of totalitarian rule, of creeping counterrevolution,” warned Kalugin (2000). “It’s no secret that the KGB, as no other power structure, was poisoned by totalitarian, Bolshevik mentality. Chekism is the very epitome of that mentality,” one that is characterized by “hatred of the past, hatred toward the powers that be, intolerance of alien ideas, views and their carriers.” Shevtsova (2007, 103) is perhaps the most alarmist. “The most negative consequence of the rise to power and entry into economic activity of security officers is the strengthening of a lawless state operating on the basis of shadowy rules,” she writes. “When brought into politics, the security service mentality leads to the acceptance of gangland methods in political and public thinking and behavior, a disregard for the law, a penchant for crushing dissent, morbid suspicion, brutality toward the weak, and servility toward the more powerful.”

Bellicose Foreign Policies

Finally, many analysts share the view expressed above by Baker and Glasser, Kalugin, and Shevtsova that siloviki share a coherent worldview—one, moreover, that extends to foreign policy. One of the most detailed and substantive treatments of the “silovik ideology” is provided by Kryshtanovskaya and White (2005, 1073), who describe it in the following terms:

The state is the basis of society; therefore, the state should be strong. A strong state controls everything. … A strong state should also control the economy, at least its natural resources, which cannot be allowed to remain in private hands. Pluralism of opinions is dangerous as it undermines the state from within. There is still an external enemy—the West—and this means that a strong army is needed, and a powerful arms industry. … [T]he aim of Russia itself should be to be feared, as only those who are feared are respected.

Moreover, they add, these ideas constitute a “national project” that siloviki regard as having “domestic and foreign opponents. Its external enemies are all who do not wish or even fear a strong Russia, the USA in particular. Internal enemies, by extension, are those who support the West and share its values.” Or as Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan (n.d.) write: “The xenophobic education provided by the FSB Academy, the main alma mater for all Russian secret services, has changed little since the fall of the Soviet Union. It makes neophytes vulnerable to all ideas supporting the notion of a global conspiracy against Russia.”

Numerous public figures and policymakers similarly attribute a xenophobic—or at least anti-American—worldview to Russia’s siloviki. For instance, Ilya Yashin (2012), a leading figure in the 2011–2012 protest movement against Putin’s rule, criticizes Security Council chief Nikolai Patrushev’s comment that foreign websites fuel the Russian protest movement, with the following remarks: “Putin and his ruling elite … have not been able to get rid of their KGB mindset. Even while they enjoy the benefits of Western luxury goods and services, they continue to hate the West, consider it an alien and dangerous culture and harbor an almost instinctive fear of a menacing threat from abroad.” Appearing on a Sunday morning talk show, the chairman of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, Ed Royce, commented: “[T]he [Obama] administration has tried to engage [Putin] on several issues such as missile defense, and has worked with him on trade issues. And we have not seen any reciprocation from the Russians on this, because this former KGB agent still has a sense of hostility to the West and to the United States” (ABC News 2013).

In a similar vein, Illarionov (2009, 71) argues that siloviki possess an “internal psychological need to wage aggressive wars” against Russia’s neighbors. During the second U.S. presidential debate of 2008, Senator John McCain applied this logic to Russia’s war with Georgia. “[L]ong ago, I warned about Vladimir Putin,” the Republican nominee stated. “I said I looked into his eyes and saw three letters, a K, a G, and a B. He has surrounded himself with former KGB apparatchiks. He has gradually repressed more of the liberties that we would expect for nations to observe, and he has exhibited most aggressive behavior, obviously, in Georgia” (Commission on Presidential Debates 2008). Not surprisingly, former president of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili fully concurs. On the first anniversary of the war, Saakashvili stated the following in a speech to his countrymen: “Our beloved nation was fighting for its very existence. The heirs of the old KGB decided to put an end to what they call the ‘Georgia project,’ our collective attempt to build a European state in a corner of Europe that had never before had one” (quoted in Barry 2009).

Like the invasion of Georgia, Russia’s more recent annexation of Crimea has been interpreted through the prism of militocracy. For instance, Steven Lee Myers’s (2014) investigation of Kremlin decision-making led him to conclude that Putin decided to seize the peninsula during a meeting with a small group of advisers that included “Sergei B. Ivanov, Mr. Putin’s chief of staff; Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the security council; and Aleksandr V. Bortnikov, the director of the Federal
Security Service.” “All are veterans of the KGB,” Myers pointedly adds.13 Months later, after the Kremlin had armed secessionist forces in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of eastern Ukraine, former secretary of state Hillary Clinton connected both the war and corruption in Russia with Putin’s previous career. “I see a very coldblooded, calculated former KGB agent,” she stated, “who is determined to not only enrich himself and his closest colleagues but also to try to revive Russia’s influence around its border” (quoted in Herszenhorn 2014). Roger Cohen (2015) similarly explains both Crimea and the anti-Western thrust of Putin’s policies by arguing that the president “has opted for his life’s work: buying people, compromising them, threatening them.”14

Finally and most notably, Putin’s KGB past also looms large in the mind of his central protagonist on the international stage over the last eight years, the president of the United States. Barack Obama ended his presidency by suffering a crushing personal defeat that resulted in part from actions ordered by his Russian counterpart. Specifically, hackers employed by Russian military intelligence skillfully engaged in “information warfare,” as Moscow calls it, for the purpose of inflicting harm on the presidential campaign of Obama’s preferred successor, Hillary Clinton (Lipton, Sanger, and Shane 2016). When discussing those events, the president hints at Putin’s prior career as the underlying driver of a whole range of policies that he regards as reprehensible. In his final interview with National Public Radio, for instance, Obama offered the following lament:

“There was a poll that came out a couple of days ago that said that 37 percent of Republicans have a favorable view of Vladimir Putin. Think about that. … This is somebody who—the former head of the KGB [sic], 15 who is responsible for crushing democracy in Russia, muzzling the press, throwing political dissidents in jail, countering American efforts to expand freedom at every turn—is currently making decisions that’s leading to a slaughter in Syria (National Public Radio 2016).

CRITICS OF THE MILITOCRACY PARADIGM

Disunity among Siloviki

As the preceding review of the multi-faceted literature on militarocracy in Russia illustrates, the approach to understanding Russia’s political evolution since 2000 that highlights Putin’s KGB background has succeeded in shaping public debate about Putin-era Russia to a greater extent than has any other theoretical approach. Indeed, it seems certain that no other master narrative or set of concepts has been employed by journalists or policymakers nearly as frequently as have those relating to Russia’s force structures. Moreover, this would seem to be true on both sides of the Atlantic.

Notwithstanding its prominence, however, the validity of several core elements of the militarocracy paradigm has been called into question. One of the paradigm’s most prominent critics is Bettina Renz (2006), who questions the very existence of a “permanent and universal ‘military mind’” determining an authoritarian outlook and uniting the very broad group of people who fall under the silovik rubric. In this regard, she reviews the careers of several prominent siloviki (Putin included) in order to demonstrate that levels of seniority differ among them, that many were occupied with “tasks required of civilian specialists, and not commonly associated with traditional military training and discipline,” and that some have supported reformist and democratic causes and parties. (For evidence on this score from recent Russian politics, Renz could point to former Duma deputy Gennadii Gudkov, a veteran of the KGB who joined the opposition to the Kremlin over the falsified parliamentary election results of 2011 [Barry 2012].)

Other analysts come to similar conclusions. For instance, criticizing Kryshтановskaya’s “concept of an all-powerful siloviki,” Thomas Gomart (2008, 56 and 58–59) asserts that “this group is far more complex. Strong internal rivalries and circumstantial alliances exist within the siloviki.” Elaborating on this point, he writes:


In the Soviet era, central authorities deliberately stoked [a silent rivalry between the armed forces and the intelligence services responsible for their monitoring] to reduce the influence of each and avoid dependency. The rivalry is also explained by their contradictory missions. While the military profession is based on perpetual silence over state affairs and apolitical conduct, the services are responsible for monitoring activities within the state and society—an eminently political task. In other words, the army avoids the political arena, while the services control it.

In an essay on why the siloviki are not likely to be a force for political change in the future, Brian Taylor (2017) likewise points to several bureaucratic, political, and economic factors that result in “neither the siloviki in general nor chekists in particular [being] a coherent and unified team. The siloviki are internally divided along both organizational (formal) and so-called ‘clan’ (informal) lines.”

Finally, a Russian scholar who stresses the ideological pluralism of siloviki is Oxana Gaman-Golutvina (2012, 129–30). In a multifaceted analysis of the composition of the State Duma, she notes that the proportion of former military officers among the deputy corps rose from 3.9 percent in 1993 to 10 percent in 2012, a trend that “has become the basis for judgments about the domination of a ‘militocracy’ that has acquired unlimited power during the rule of V.V. Putin.” Nevertheless, Gaman-Golutvina deems “such a judgment to be not entirely accurate.” “It would be a mistake to see in the ‘siloviki’ full-fledged lobbyists for the military–industrial complex,” she writes. “An analysis of the votes cast in the State Duma by this group does not reveal a tight dependence of their political sympathies on their professional biographies. Moreover, former military officers often turn out to be appointees of financial groups that are...
taking advantage of the symbolic capital of former officers in their lobbying efforts.17

Are siloviki as ideologically diverse as these four scholars maintain? At least one survey of elite attitudes conducted between March and May of 2008 suggests that in some ways they are. Specifically, on the basis of over a thousand interviews (one hundred of them with siloviki) with representatives of a wide range of professions residing in both Moscow and roughly three-quarters of Russia’s regions, Mikhail Afanas’ev (2009) found that assessments of the country’s development under Putin offered by military officers differed starkly from those offered by individuals entrusted with internal security. Whereas 70 percent of “chekisty,” for instance, agreed with the proposition that “Russia has risen from its knees. … The state on the whole is successfully formulating and implementing a strategy of national development,” only 9 percent (!) of army officers concurred. The opposite proposition—that “instead of modernization, institutions are degrading and the economy and state administration are becoming more primitive”—was endorsed by 23 percent of chekisty and 79 percent of army officers (Afanas’ev 2009, Table 1).

The two groups also differed in their evaluations of the state of democracy in Russia. Whereas 70 percent of chekisty (the highest proportion of any of the nine professional subgroups under examination) gave the state high marks in regard to “guaranteeing free elections,” only 31 percent of army officers did so (Table 2). Similarly, a plurality of chekisty (37 percent, again the highest proportion of any subgroup) preferred the system of presidially appointed regional governors in place at the time, yet only 16 percent of army officers did so. A return to the system of direct gubernatorial elections was supported by 33 percent of chekisty and fully 58 percent of army officers (Table 17). Finally, fully two-thirds of chekisty and only one-third of army officers favored an increase (!) in the executive branch’s control over the judiciary, whereas a plurality (47 percent) of army officers and only 19 percent of chekisty wanted to strengthen “societal control over judges” and establish mechanisms to hold judges accountable for “procedural violations” (Table 16).

On the other hand, apart from their assessments of how well Russia’s electoral and judicial systems were functioning, value differences between the two groups on other issues were little in evidence in Afanas’ev’s survey data. For instance, both types of siloviki supported “state control over key economic sectors and assets” as well as “the creation of state corporations,” more than did any other subgroup (Tables 8 and 9). In addition, both expressed the lowest levels of support for increasing legislative oversight of the executive branch as well as the highest levels of support for state control over major media outlets (Tables 14 and 19). And finally, an identical 49 percent of both military and internal security officers expressed agreement with the Slavophile/Eurasianist view that “Russia is a unique civilization, one that is fundamentally dissimilar to both Europe and Asia.” Moreover, they were the only two professional subgroups in which the percentage of individuals possessing this view surpassed that of Westernizers (Table 7).

A second sociological study conducted two years earlier lends even stronger support to the notion that all kinds of siloviki question the benefits of liberal democracy for Russia. Specifically, in 2006–2007, a team of Russian scholars headed by Mikhail Tarusin (2008) conducted a survey of elites in 33 of Russia’s regions regarding attitudes toward both democracy and private property. After categorizing their 326 respondents—which included 31 high-ranking members of the MVD, procuracy, army, and Ministry for Emergency Situations—into ten occupational subgroups, they found that “employees of the force structures” contained the second lowest percentage of “active supporters of democracy” and by far the highest percentage of individuals “holding the opinion that the existing political system does not require any modifications” (12, and Figures 4.1 and 4.3–4.10). This subgroup also possessed the highest percentage of respondents (83 percent) who felt that Russia’s main priority should be “the strengthening of the state and the law” and the lowest (17 percent) holding the view that it should be “the development of private initiative and entrepreneurship” (Figure 4.17). And finally, the highest percentage holding the view that governmental power in Russia should be used to promote “order in the country” and the lowest percentage advocating “freedom for its citizens” as its primary purpose were found precisely in the siloviki subgroup (Figure 13.11).

The Systematic Inflation of the Numbers of Siloviki

A different kind of critique of the research undergirding the militocracy paradigm has been advanced by the current authors. In two separate articles, we conduct two types of analyses, the first of which consists of a reexamination of Kryshtanovskaya and White’s methods and data (Rivera and Rivera 2006; Rivera and Rivera 2014a). As was discussed above, those scholars report the percentages of “military-security representatives” in each of the five elite sectors that they analyze and then average these figures together to produce an aggregate “average by cohort” at various points in time between 1988 and 2008. As we point out, however, Kryshtanovskaya and White (2003) do not provide any theoretical justification for creating a summary indicator for each cohort by averaging together the percentages in their five elite sectors. Moreover, their “average by cohort” averages together the scores of groups of very different sizes as if they were equivalent in either size or significance—a procedure that will produce distorted values if any of the very large or very small elite sectors possess extreme scores (which is, in fact, the case in their data). We then recalculate the percentages of siloviki in each of Kryshtanovskaya and
White’s elite cohorts and discover that the unweighted, actual figures grew from 4.4 percent in 1988 to 13.9 percent in 2002 and 20.5 percent in 2008, or less than half of the 42 percent figure that Kryshantovskaya and White report and that has been widely disseminated (Rivera and Rivera 2014a, Table 2). 18

The second set of empirical analyses that we conducted consists of a demographic study of Russian “societal” (as opposed to purely governmental) elites on the basis of original data. Specifically, we analyze the biographies of the full complement of individuals listed in four separate editions of Federal’naia i regional’naia elita Rossiï [various years]: Kto est’ kto v politike i ekonomike. Ezhegodnyi biograficheskii spravochnik [The Federal and Regional Elite of Russia: Who Is Who in Politics and the Economy. An Annual Biographical Directory], which were published by the Center for Political Information, an independent research center located in Moscow. Our sample of elites “is more comprehensive [than Kryshantovskaya and White’s sample]”—in that it contains both media and cultural figures and high-ranking officers in the Russian military (such as members of the General Staff and the commanders of Russia’s major fleets)—and “also includes most of the key members of the federal government and the two houses of the Federal Assembly” (Rivera and Rivera 2006, 133).

After coding the professional backgrounds of the 2,539 individuals listed in one or more of the directories, we find that the percentage of this wider swath of the Russian elite with employment experience in any of Russia’s force structures was a mere 13.1 percent in 2001, 12.2 percent in 2002, 13.7 percent in 2004, and 14.2 percent in 2006 (Rivera and Rivera 2014a, Table 2). In other words, our data show that the presence of siloviki in influential positions increased between Putin’s first and second presidential terms, but only slightly and not nearly to the extent that Kryshantovskaya and White claim. 19 “Overall,” we conclude, “both our analyses of Russia’s societal elite and our re-analyses of Kryshantovskaya’s data on the political elite paint a rather different—and less alarming—picture of the depths to which siloviki have penetrated the corridors of power since 2000 than has been commonly depicted in both scholarship and the media” (Rivera and Rivera 2014a, 42–43). Specifically, rather than the “[a]lmost half” that Kryshantovskaya (2008, 596) claimed, militarization under Putin actually peaked at one-fifth of Russian officialdom and just one-seventh of the elite broadly defined.

THE REMAINING RESEARCH AGENDA

The preceding overview of research critical of the militarocracy paradigm highlights several serious defects in the state of existing knowledge about both the implications and the very extent of the militarization of the polity that has occurred since KGB lieutenant colonel Putin ascended to the presidency. Notwithstanding the framework’s prominence in analyses of Russia, neither its proponents nor its critics should be satisfied with either the quantity or the quality of empirical evidence undergirding it. In our view, the most pressing issues on the remaining research agenda on this topic consist of the following.

First, the arguments advanced by Renz, Gomart, Taylor, and Gaman-Golutvina serve to remind us that too little existing research explores possible differences among the viewworlds possessed by Russia’s varied assortment of siloviki. On the one hand, at least two empirical studies—Mikhail Afanas’ev’s Rossiiskie elity razvitiiia and Mikhail Tarusin’s Summa ideologii—provide evidence supporting the notion that representatives of the force structures favor core elements of a democratic polity to a far lesser extent than do their civilian counterparts. In addition, both chekisty and other types of siloviki have less trust in free-market mechanisms and less desire for Russia to model itself after Europe. On the other hand, notwithstanding rising budgets for both internal security and the conventional military during Putin’s first two terms as president, the two groups viewed the country’s economic and political trajectory during those eight years very differently. Whereas chekisty were consistently among the government’s strongest supporters, conventional military officers were frequently as critical and dispirited as members of various civilian professions. Such divergent outlooks warrant further investigation.

Second, possible differences between the views held by KGB officers who were engaged in foreign espionage and stationed abroad, on the one hand, and those held by KGB officers who were engaged in domestic surveillance and repression of dissent, on the other, remains completely unstudied. In this regard, in his memoirs, Major General Kalugin (1994, 148) describes the latter category of siloviki in scathing terms. Most of the KGB’s “enormous army of a half-million men,” he writes, served the KGB at home, comprising that huge totalitarian apparatus that hounded dissidents and troublemakers, opened mail, tapped telephone lines, eavesdropped on apartments and offices, shadowed foreigners, investigated crimes, and generally kept an iron grip on our sprawling and—just below the surface—unruly land. We in the KGB’s foreign operations were a relatively small, elite unit, and we were proud that we trained our sights on foreign enemies of the Soviet Union, not on our own people. In fact, most of us in [Foreign] Intelligence viewed the domestic KGB as an unsavory, cruel, and totalitarian organization, and we were glad to have as little to do with it as possible.

Alekandr Lebedev, an ex-KGB officer who subsequently became a media magnate in both Russia and Britain, shares such sentiments. “Don’t confuse foreign intelligence with the KGB,” he comments. “I am of the opinion that the KGB was a notorious organization linked to the gulags. That’s nothing to do with
foreign intelligence” (quoted in Cowell 2009). In light of both Kalugin’s and Lebedev’s testimony regarding the views prevailing among foreign intelligence officers, substantial differences in the policy preferences of these different types of KGB officers seem likely.

Turning to the extent of silovik penetration of the Russian elite, we can say that—in contrast to the relatively poor state of existing knowledge about possible value differences among the groups discussed above—we do have a rather firm sense of this issue. Specifically, as our prior research has demonstrated, we know that the actual extent of such penetration is much lower than—in fact, roughly half of what—is generally believed. In fact, whether one examines only Russian “officialdom” or a broader cross-section of influential members of Russian society, the correct inference to draw from extant data is that perhaps Russia’s top political leadership came to be dominated by siloviki during the Putin presidency but its elite as a whole definitely did not.

Nonetheless, we would also argue that the amount of systematic empirical evidence undergirding our knowledge about the patterns of elite recruitment from the power ministries that has taken place under Putin is small relative to the prominence of the militocracy framework in both Russian and American discourse about Russia. Hence, a third pressing area for investigation is whether other data sets and/or different elite populations would generate estimates of the extent of militarization that are similar to or different from Kryshtanovskaya and White’s estimates and those produced by us. In addition, analyses of military-security representation in the elites of other countries, especially Russia’s post-communist neighbors, would add an interesting and potentially useful comparative dimension to our understanding of the extent, causes, and consequences of militarization in Russia.

Fourth and finally, we would argue that the most pressing gap in the study of militarocracy lies in the realm of comparative theory-testing. That is, we lack systematic evaluations of the extent to which either the shape of Russia’s institutions or the content of Kremlin policies conforms to expectations generated by the militocracy paradigm, whether in isolation or relative to the explanatory power of other theoretical approaches. With respect to the latter, the militarocracy paradigm could be evaluated against at least five alternative frameworks. These frameworks define Russia as: a petrostate—a state shaped by an oversized role of exported hydrocarbons in its economy (Goldman 2008); a kleptocracy—a state organized primarily to benefit an avaricious ruling elite (Dawisha 2014);

a “dual state”—a polity whose actual practices deviate widely from its formal laws and constitution (Sakwa 2011); a “patronalistic” state—a polity that is organized around hierarchical, pyramid-like patron–client networks (Hale 2015); and a “one-man regime”—an autocracy in which policymaking “remains the prerogative of one person alone” (Kotkin 2015, 141 and 153). Given that the most important test of any paradigm is its ability to account for observed empirical phenomena, the absence of competitive testing of the militarocracy paradigm against plausible alternatives represents a major lacuna in the study of contemporary Russian politics.

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NOTES

1. For a quantitative analysis of Russia’s democratic backsliding in both longitudinal and cross-national perspective, see Rivera and Rivera (2009).
2. It should be noted that, unlike in the United States, where FBI and CIA agents are considered to be civilians, their counterparts in Russia hold military ranks and wear uniforms. As a result, like officers in the conventional armed forces, all such employees are regarded as “military men.”
5. In this vein, see also Charles Clover (2012).
6. Moreover, Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White (2003, 300) estimate the percentage of siloviki among deputies to the seven original plenipotentiary representatives to be 70 percent. In contrast, Paul Goode (2011, Table 4.2) estimates this percentage to be 28.4 percent.
7. Petrov (2005, 23) puts this figure at 75 percent; Goode (2011, 68–69) estimates it to be 24 percent. Goode also includes a description of the functions of these inspectors.
8. See also Zoltan Barany (2007, 100).
9. For more details and ample discussion, see Daria Litvinova (2016). It should be noted, however, that at least one analyst disputes this interpretation. “Whereas once Putin looked to his former comrades in the KGB and the St. Petersburg administration for his go-to guys,” writes Mark Galeotti (2016b), “now he is recruiting disproportionately from the people he knows. Given his cloistered lifestyle, that often means bodyguards, personal assistants, and the like.”
10. See also Aaron Bateman (2014, 390). Bateman’s article contains all of the core components of the militarocracy paradigm that are discussed above and below.
11. See also Yuri Felshinsky and Vladimir Pribylovsky (2008, 193).
13. That the annexation of Crimea was essentially a silovik-driven project is also advanced by Barry (2014) and Maxim Trudolyubov (2014).
14. See also Paul Krugman (2014).
15. Putin headed the KGB’s main successor organization, the FSB, not the KGB.
16. On this point, see also Galeotti (2016a, 10) and Andrei Soldatov and Michael Rochlitz (n.d.).
17. For similar arguments made in reference to the governors’ corps, see Gaman-Golutvina (2008, 1047).
18. For instance, the 42 percent figure is cited in Felshinsky and Pribylovsky (2008, 199) and Harding (2011, 11).
19. In addition, in an appendix to our 2014 article (Rivera and Rivera 2014b), we review three other studies of the extent of elite militarization and observe that that all three of them “find the percentage of siloviki in the political elite to be considerably lower than does Kryshtanovskaya and White.” Similarly, Helge Blakkisrud’s (2015, 214–20) original analysis of Russia’s gubernatorial corps finds that only 14.5 percent of them had backgrounds in the force structures in 2009, whereas Kryshtanovskaya and White report a figure of 21 percent in 2008.


