Although no formalized studies have been done on the fledgling Cleveland school voucher program, the program warrants special attention. The most controversial feature of the Cleveland program warrants special attention. The most controversial feature of the Cleveland program is that it grants parents vouchers which can be used at any private school. The program therefore allows vouchers to be used at religious elementary schools. What is even more significant is the fact that an Ohio State Court has already upheld the policy. Nevertheless, the ACLU is appealing the decision, meaning the case may find its way into the Supreme Court of the United States.
Constitutional Issues Raised by the Cleveland Case
Vouchers have historically raised constitutional issues. "Voucher plans were tried in the South after 1954 as a means of supporting segregated schools, but these were found unconstitutional," (Pulliam, 1995, 186). Since that time period, however, most voucher proposals have "guarded against racial discrimination," (Pulliam, 1995, 186).
The most important reason that the Cleveland case is so critical is that it may lead to a Supreme Court decision. The potential decision will determine finally whether vouchers will go to religious schools. At the core of this case is a bitterly divisive debate over the relationship between the government and religious institutions. An analysis of past court cases relating to church and state issues will provide a framework for determining how the Court might decide.
Perhaps the most significant precedent relating to the Cleveland case was established in Witters v. Washington Department of Services (1986). In that case, a unanimous Supreme Court decided that "the state could provide funds for vocational rehabilitation services to a blind student pursuing studies at a Christian college to become a minister," (479 U.S. 481 1986). The Court pointed out that to grant state money to a student which the student chooses to use at a public or private religious school "is not an impermissible state endorsement," (Kermerer, p. 308). However, the Court has historically drawn a distinction between higher education and secondary or elementary schools (Kermerer, p. 308). At any rate, an analysis of this case in particular demonstrates that "public monies used to finance private choices do not create an inference that the government endorses religion," (Kermerer, p. 308).
The Supreme Court could essentially go either way on the Cleveland case, if it sticks to constitutional precedents. Although the Court upheld free choice of individuals who receive public money to use at the school of choice, this was only done in the case of higher education. Perhaps the Court may point out this distinction as grounds for claiming that the Cleveland program is unconstitutional. If the Court decides to use this rationale, the provision of public money for individual use at religious elementary schools (the Cleveland Program) would amount to de facto endorsement of religion by the state. However, if the Court does not draw this distinction, and instead uses the rationale of the Witters case, the Court may uphold the Cleveland case as constitutional. In that case, the Court would have to defend the decision to use a voucher at a religious school as a free choice by a parent that would not equate to state endorsement of religion. What makes the case of Cleveland all the more exciting is that the separation of church and state has not been clearly defined in the past. The case gives the Supreme Court considerable latitude of judgment based on some seemingly conflicting precedents. Regardless of its potential outcome, the Cleveland case is important because it will clearly define the meaning of the separation of church and state in the United States.
Government 375: Educational Reform and Ideology