Philip A. Klinkner , "Court and Country in American Politics:The Democratic Party and the 1994 Election," from Philip A. Klinkner, Midterm: The Elections of 1994 in Context (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996) pp. 61-80.

By any measure, the elections of 1994 were a significant reverse for the Democratic party; losing fifty-four House seats, eight Senate seats, and majority control of both houses of Congress for the first time in forty-two years is no small achievement. In comparison, the average midterm House seat loss for the president’s party in the post-war era is 25.5 seats, but the average for he first midterm in an administration is only 13.3 seats (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1995: 288).

Most analysts have attributed these losses to the unpopularity of Bill Clinton and the political gaffes of his administration, but this is too simplistic. In previous midterm elections since World War II, Presidents with poll ratings and less prosperous economies have escaped the kind of drubbing suffered by Bill Clinton and the Democrats in 1994. Instead, the weaknesses of the Clinton administration and the results of the 1994 election are both symptomatic of larger changes in the political and economic environment. In this chapter, I argue that the results of the 1994 elections stemmed from three interrelated factors--the rise of a "Court versus Country" dynamic in contemporary American politics, the decline of the Democratic party, and the political and policy failures of the Clinton administration-- each of which combined together in 1994 to hand the Democratic party its worst defeat since the New Deal and to raise serious questions about its future prospects.

As recently as November 1992, the position of the Democratic party appeared to be uncommonly healthy. Bill Clinton’s victory had ended the party’s long absence from the White House, and in doing so, he had managed to win several states in the South and the West that had long eluded Democratic presidential canidates. Furthermore, the Democrats’ continued control of Congress, particularly in the House of Representatives, seemed assured.

Still, the results of the 1992 election portended difficulties for the Democrats. Clinton’s 43 percent of the popular vote succeeded only in the context of three-man race and failed to improve on the party’s anemic performance in recent presidential elections. Clinton edged out Hubert Humphrey’s 42.7 percent in 1968, George McGovern’s 37.5 percent in 1972, Jimmy Carter’s 41 percent in 1980, and Walter Mondale’s 40.6 percent in 1984, but he failed to best Jimmy Carter’s 50.1 percent in 1976 or even Michael Dukakis’s 45.6 percent in 1988. Additionally, Clinton had no coattails for his fellow Democrats, gaining no seats in the Senate and losing ten in the House. Among recent Presidents, only John Kennedy had shorter coattails, losing twenty House and two Senate seats when he was elected in 1960. But Kennedy’s lack of coattails seems understandable given the Democratic sweep of forty-nine House and seventeen Senate seats in the 1958 election. In comparison, preceding Bill Clinton’s victory in 1992, the Democrats had managed to gain only nine House seats and one Senate seat in 1990 (Stanley and Niemi 1994: 114-115, 124-125).

Most importantly, the circumstances surrounding the 1992 election provided ample evidence of a radically changed political environment. Several observers have commented on the growing volatility of the electorate since the late 1980s (Greider 1992; Phillips 1990, 1993, and 1994; Germond and Witcover 1993; Greenberg 1995). By most accounts, this phenomenon reached a new high in 1992, as voters expressed growing disgust with the federal government, elected officials, special interests, and politics in general, and a greater willingness to support outsider candidacies, even those of such diverse figures as Jerry Brown, Pat Buchanan, and Ross Perot.

While many observers have attempted to label this recent political ferment as "populist," this seems inaccurate on two counts. First, the term populist is extremely broad and ill-defined, often used to describe any passion or sentiment, no matter what its ideological substance, that attracts significant popular support. Second, the more specific use of the term populist to refer to anti-big business, anti-free market, pro-government ideology of the People’s Party in the 1890s, does not accurately describe the current pro-free market, anti-government sentiment of current politics.

Others have suggested that these new political trends mark a conservative groundswell. But, this description also seems ill-fitting. American conservatism has taken almost as many forms as populism. At various times in the past, conservatives stood for a powerful federal government, an activist program of national economic development, and strong support for law and order, all of which fail to describe the libertarian dimensions of the current electoral discontent (Lind 1995). Moreover, if conservatism is usually defined as the maintenance and preservation of existing institutions, then current popular sentiments are anything but.

Rather than populist or conservative, current American politics is best understood in light of the "Court versus Country" dynamic that has been a recurring theme in Anglo-American politics over the last 300 years. The label was first used to describe the intense political conflict in English politics from the Revolution of 1688 until the mid-eighteenth century. Historians have also used the Court versus Country framework to describe the politics of America’s early national period, roughly from the Articles of Confederation to the election of Thomas Jefferson.

Politics in both of these periods revolved around the scope and legitimacy of governmental power. On the one side was a Court persuasion, which firmly believed in the necessity of a powerful central government to ensure prosperity, domestic order, and international prestige. "Court apologists were intensely statist . . . . They tried to endow the government with the resources and vigor necessary to command great respect abroad and maintain order at home" (Murrin 1980: 379) To achieve these ends, Court proponents advocated increased taxation, expanded government expenditures, a funded public debt, government guidance of nation’s economic and financial systems, and a bureaucracy large and powerful enough to ensure the attainment of the government’s objectives.

In opposition stood the Country advocates who saw the Court proponents as a corrupt elite, antagonistic to the economic interests and cultural values of the nation and striving to increase the power of government to serve their own evil ends. Moreover, Country supporters believed that the Court faction, through its links with financial elites and political manipulations, had managed to entrench itself into the office, upsetting the political system’s natural balance. Once free from the usual checks and balances, they claimed that the Court elite would then set out to further aggrandize power and debase the natural rights and liberties of the people. In response, the Country supporters advocated limited government, reduction of government debt and spending, reduction and/or reform of taxes, and structural and procedural reforms of the political system as a means of restoring the proper control and accountability to the government.

These Court versus Country themes are readily discernible in contemporary American politics. To a large extent, with their emphasis on a powerful federal government to provide direction and leadership on a range of issues, from macroeconomic management to civil rights to environmental protection, modern liberal ideology reflects the Court tradition of earlier times. In addition, the liberals’ tools of increased expenditures and government debt, were also used by the English Court supporters and their American descendants, the Federalists.

The Country attitude, with its "plain distrust of government as such, and a considerable sense of apprehension at its ever spreading tentacles" (Holmes 1987: 121), is readily apparent in current popular attitudes. Like their Country predecessors, current critics of the political system oppose excessive government, as reflected in debt, high taxes, increased spending, and extensive regulation. In particular, they share the traditional Country concern for governmental corruption, especially the ways in which elected officials, bureaucrats, and special interests combine to create an entrenched governmental elite, unresponsive and unaccountable to the public interest. In the words of Ross Perot, "The British aristocracy we drove out in our Revolution has been replaced by our own version: a political nobility that is immune to the people’s will. They have created through our campaign and lobbying laws a series of incentives that corrupt the intent of the Constitution" (Perot 1992: 24). Criticisms of entrenched congressional incumbents echo the attacks of English Country advocates on the corrupt placemen and courtiers whom they believed were destroying the House of Commons. In fact, proposals for congressional term limits closely resemble the Place bills advocated by English Country members for "purging the House of Commons from the dead weight of court officers and dependents" (Holmes 1987: 130). In addition, James Madison’s concern in 1791 that, "The stock-jobbers will become the pretorian band of the Government, at once its tool & its tyrant; bribed by its largesses, & overawing it by clamours & combinations" sounds very similar to contemporary concerns regarding special interests and their role in government policy making (Elkins and McKitrick 1993: 244).

The general tone and conduct of politics in these eras also reflects that of modern America. In a statement that accurately sums up current popular attitudes regarding American politics, one historian described the politics of eighteenth century England in the following way, "Deceit and double dealing on the part of kings, ministers, and politicians, cynicism on the part of the people, produced an appalling debasement of politics. Nothing was taken on trust or at its state face-value. Self-interest, hypocrisy and corruption were taken for granted. Politicians, like revelers in a carnival, were assumed to be wearing masks in order to conceal their true features, and to aid them in the seduction of their victims" (Jones 1978: 2-3). The conflict between the Hamiltonians and Jeffersonians was also marked by the high levels of cynicism and distrust found today. One can easily imagine Rush Limbaugh as a latter-day version of Philip Freneau, the Jeffersonian editor whose gifts at calumny bedeviled his Federalists opponents as much as they delighted his fellow partisans (Elkins and McKitrick 1993: 282-292; Banning 1978: 167-178).

The rise of these Country attitudes in contemporary America seems to have resulted from a number of forces, one of which was the civil rights movement of the 1960s and ensuing white backlash. As many commentators have noted, the federal government’s support for racial liberalism in the 1960s profoundly alienated large numbers of white Americans. In addition, to the extent that they identified racial liberalism with the federal government, many whites began to question the scope and legitimacy of the governmental power on a range of issues from taxes to welfare to the criminal justice system (Edsall and Edsall 1991; Dionne 1991; Horowitz 1986).

Along with white alienation over civil rights, the lackluster performance of the U.S. economy over the last twenty years has contributed to popular distrust of government. From the New Deal until the early 1970s, economic prosperity and the identification of that prosperity with government activity contributed to popular support for the political system. With the end of the post-World War II economic boom, that identification has reversed itself as many Americans have increasingly come to identify the government with stagnant economic growth and growing class inequalities (Dionne 1991; Phillips 1990, 1993, and 1994).

Vietnam and Watergate also added to public cynicism toward government. In the case of Vietnam, many liberals began to question the benevolence of a government that could carry out a savage and unpopular war in a far-away land for no clear reason, while many conservatives came to question the competence of a government that could lose the nation’s first war to small and technologically backward nation. With Watergate, the spectacle of Richard Nixon’s abuse of power, law-breaking, and bold-faced lies to the American people profoundly shook public confidence in the political system.

Finally, the end of the Cold War also served to undermine support for the federal government. So long as Americans believed in the existence of the Soviet threat, then they were willing to support the necessity of a powerful federal government to meet that threat. Moreover, each day that Americans awoke to find that the Soviets had not launched their missiles or invaded Western Europe provided evidence of the federal government’s effectiveness. The fall of the Soviet Union undermined much of the necessity for a strong federal government and made its accomplishments less visible.

As a result of these events and developments, by the early 1990s, Country sentiments were evident among much of the public. In 1964, over 70 percent of the public said that they could trust Washington to do what was right most or all of the time; by early 1994, only 19 percent expressed similar confidence (Phillips 1994: 7). In 1964, when asked, "Would you say the government is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all people," nearly 40 percent more people agreed with the latter than with the former. In 1992 that sentiment had reversed itself, with 60 percent more people believing that the government was run for the benefit of special interests than those who believed it was run for the benefit of all (Stanley and Niemi: 169). As a consequence of this marked increase in public cynicism toward government, politics increasingly revolved around such Country oriented themes as tax revolts, anti-incumbent movements, term limits, support for independent and third party candidates, concern over the role of special interests and corruption, attacks on congressional pay raises, political reform, and anger at policy gridlock, among others.

Though highly developed by the early 1990s, the Court versus Country divide did not neatly overlay the partisan division between Democrats and Republicans until after the election of Bill Clinton in 1992. Prior to this, Watergate, divided control of government, and the distinctly Court background and outlook (despite his Texas affectations) of Republican George Bush prevented the Republicans from capitalizing on this divide by clearly labeling themselves as the Country party and the Democrats as the Court party. During the 1992 campaign, Democrats Paul Tsongas and Jerry Brown, Republican Pat Buchanan, and independent Ross Perot also sought to highlight these Court versus Country distinctions, further obscuring its partisan aspects. In fact, Bill Clinton successfully played to Country sentiments through a variety of gestures in his election campaign: travelling by bus through small town America, denouncing Washington corruption, attacking George Bush’s aristocratic bearing and disdain for domestic policy, extolling the virtues of ordinary Americans who "do the work, pay the taxes, raise the kids, and play by the rules," and distancing himself from traditional liberalism by labeling himself a "New Democrat"(Clinton and Gore 1992: 217 and Germond and Witcover 1993).

Still, the emergence of Court and Country politics spelled trouble for the Democrats. As the party of governmental activism, the Democrats were bound to suffer from the rise of popular cynicism toward government. At the same time that Bill Clinton was winning the White House, voters preferred having "government cost less in taxes but provide fewer services" to having "government provide more services but cost more in taxes" by 54 to 38 percent (Milkis and Nelson 1994: 395).

Compounding the problem of the Democrats’ ideological identification with Court politics was its organizational decline over the last three decades. During this period, the Democrats’ once robust party organizations atrophied to the point of non-existence or irrelevance. The national party organizations, represented by the Democratic National Committee and the two congressional campaign committees, have devolved into fundraising machines and campaign service providers, mainly for congressional incumbents, and lack any meaningful grassroots organization. The state and local parties are but a shadow of their former selves; their ability to influence the party’s presidential nominations eroded by procedural reforms and with many serving as little more than conduits for the flow of soft money from PACs and wealthy contributors into the coffers of the national party. In the words of journalist William Greider, "The Democratic party, as a political organization, is no longer quite real itself. The various strands of personal communication and loyalty that once made it representative and reponsive to the people are gone" (Greider 1992: 247).

Among extra-party organizations, the situation is little better. The Democratic Leadership Council, which once aspired (at least rhetorically) to offer an new base and a new vision for the party, never advanced far beyond its origins as a factional grouping propped up by PAC donations. Labor unions, which once provided the backbone of Democratic party organization and resources, have declined precipitously, now organizing little over 10 percent of American workers and exerting a diminishing influence on their remaining members.

The Democrats’ organizational demise severed almost all their links with the grassroots. Consequently, by the early 1990s, most voters had little direct association with the Democratic party. Instead of the being an important part of the civic life of many ordinary Americans as it was in earlier days, the party had become an abstract entity, easily distorted by Republican attacks and visible only in the distant and often unpopular national-level politicians covered by the media. Without party organizations to link them to Democratic politicians, it became even easier for voters to see the Democrats as a Court element comprised of distant and unresponsive elite.

The image of the Democrats as the Court party was grounded in reality as well as perception. As voters lost touch with the party, the party lost touch with them. Where once they had been able to listen to the needs and concerns of real people voiced in party clubhouses and union halls, Democratic politicians increasingly relied upon and resembled the social and financial elites with whom they increasingly associated. As a result, the Democratic party proved either unable or unwilling to respond to the growing Country anger at government in general and the Democratic party in particular.

The organizational demise of the Democratic party also damaged its capacity to serve as a mobilizing institution. Such a capacity is vital to the party since the core of its support comes from those people who lack the educational and economic resources necessary to mobilize themselves. Without organizations like parties and unions to inform and encourage them regarding politics and elections, ordinary voters in general and likely Democratic voters in particular are far more inclined to stay at home (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).

Finally, the decline of the institutions comprising the Democratic party also created difficulties regarding campaign finance. Strong party organizations and powerful unions that persuaded and mobilized voters made the Democrats less dependent upon money for their political operations. What money the party did need came largely from these same sources and generally reflected the same interests as rank and file Democratic voters. As party organizations and unions waned, the Democrats were forced to rely on more expensive forms of campaigning: media appeals, high-priced consultants, public opinion polls, and paid campaign workers. To obtain this money, the Democrats turned to donations from special interests. These special interests, however, were less compatible with the interests of Democratic voters and were inclined to give money only in return for the access and favors granted by Democratic incumbents in Congress. Consequently, the Democratic party’s actions and interests were increasingly centered around its congressional incumbents and their special interest allies, a dangerous burden in the Court versus Country division of American politics.

In contrast to the demise of the Democrats, the Republican party in this period underwent an organizational renaissance, vastly expanding the capabilities of its national party institutions and increasing it ability to reach and mobilize grassroots voters through conservative interests groups like the Christian Coalition and the National Rifle Association (Green 1995). By developing a sophisticated direct-mail fundraising operation, the Republicans abandoned their fat cat image and relied on small donations from numerous individual donors, thereby avoiding the conflict between money and votes that has bedeviled the Democrats in recent years. Finally, the advent of satellite broadcasting and conservative talk radio gave the Republican party an important means by which party leaders could contact and listen to grassroots conservatives (Klinkner 1994: 139-141, 193-196).

As a result of its organizational decline, by the early 1990s, the Democratic party’s institutional base consisted of little more than congressional incumbents. This development was both sad and ironic for the Democrats. In the 1820s and 1830s, the rise of the Jacksonian Democratic party marked the emergence of the first mass-based party organizations and throughout their history, the Democrats have been able to rely upon an array of party and non-party organizations to link it to the grassroots and to sustain it through good times and bad. With the decline of these organizations, one could argue that by the early 1990s the Democratic party had reverted back to its pre-Jacksonian form, an elite clique centered around the party’s elected officials in Congress.

Following the election of Bill Clinton, the Democratic party found itself in a high risk position. The party now controlled the White House for the first time in over a decade and this, along with control of Congress, provided them with the opportunity to implement policies which could help to revitalize the party and its constituent elements. More importantly, by enacting legislation that helped to restore prosperity and reduce economic uncertainty for average Americans, they could help to restore confidence in the federal government and minimize the Court versus Country divisions that worked to their increasing disadvantage.

Still, the election made the Democrats extremely vulnerable. As mentioned previously, unified control of the White House and Congress by the Democrats removed the previous partisan ambiguity regarding Court and Country divisions; from now on the Democrats could more clearly be labeled as the party of government. Furthermore, if the Democrats were unable to enact the above mentioned proposals, they would fail to arrest their party’s decline and deepen public cynicism toward government and themselves. Whatever the risks they were confronting, the Clinton administration appeared blissfully ignorant of them and in its first two years in office committed a series of political and policy errors that weakened the Democratic party and exacerbated Country antagonisms toward it.

The first of these errors was the abandonment of political reform, a central focus of Country sentiments, as an integral part of the administration’s agenda. In 1992, Bill Clinton campaigned on a number of Country themes, denouncing a Congress that "raised its pay and guarded its perks while most Americans worked harder for less money," and claiming that "the last twelve years were nothing less than an extended hunting season for high-priced lobbyists and Washington influence peddlers" (Greenberg 1995: 213; Phillips 1994: 43). On election night, in his victory speech to the nation, he said:

This promise was soon forgotten. Clinton quickly realized that continuing his attack on special interests meant taking on some of the most important elements in his own party--congressional Democrats and the Democratic elements of the Washington lobbying community--thereby jeopardizing his other policy proposals. And this was something that Bill Clinton was unwilling to do. According to journalist Elizabeth Drew:

In addition to abandoning his political reform proposals, the President reinforced his administration’s Court image by relying heavily on the Washington Democratic political establishment to staff his administration. Among those initially tapped to serve were: Senator Lloyd Bentsen as Secretary of the Treasury Lloyd Bentsen, Congressman Les Aspin as Secretary of Defense, DNC chairman and Washington lobbyist Ron Brown as Secretary of Commerce, Congressman Mike Espy as Secretary of Agriculture, and Congressman Leon Panetta as Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

Perhaps no appointment reflected the Clinton administration’s cozying up the Washington Democratic establishment as much as that of Tony Coelho, who coordinated the efforts of the White House and the DNC during the 1994 campaign. Coelho served as a veritable poster boy for Country antagonism toward Washington. A former House member, head of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, and Majority Whip, he was instrumental in helping incumbent Democrats shakedown PACs for contributions during the 1980s. In 1989, he resigned his seat after the discovery that he had committed various ethics violations and became a managing director in the investment banking firm of Wertheim Schroeder--hardly the type of figure likely allay popular suspicions about Washington (Shalit 1995).

Clinton’s decision to ally himself with Congressional Democrats and the Washington Democratic establishment appears to have been a Faustian bargain. While gaining support for his economic program, the President tied his fortunes to perhaps the most unpopular elements in government and further increased the identification of the Democrats as the Court party. While many observers have noted that too close of an identification with the Bill Clinton spelled political trouble for many Democrats in Congress, it also seems likely that the Clinton administration was hurt by its identification with Congress.

A series of ethical scandals further validated the perception of the Clinton administration as part and parcel of a corrupt Washington Court elite. Agriculture Secretary Espy resigned in 1994 after accepting gifts from a firm that had an interest in the regulations set by his department, and the Justice Department appointed special prosecutors to look into possible ethical misdeeds by Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and Housing Secretary Henry Cisneros. Federal prosecutors also indicted House Way and Means Committee Chairman, Dan Rostenkowski, a key supporter of the President’s budget and health plans, for misusing office expenses. On top of all of this was the President and the First Lady’s involvement in the Whitewater affair. The accusations of cozy real estate deals, politically motivated loans, too-good-to-be-true winnings in the cattle futures market market, and campaign finance irregularities comprised exactly the sort of corrupt dealings that modern Country advocates have come to associate with governing elites.

Along with the abandonment of political reform and increasing identification in the mind of the public with Court corruption, the Clinton administration failed to develop economic proposals which would ease the growing economic insecurity that had done much to generate Country antagonisms toward Washington and which needed to be allayed in order to restore public support for activist government. One aspect of this failure in economic policy was the administration’s early decision to sacrifice some of its more populist economic proposals at the alter of deficit reduction. This strategy met with the approval of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and the bond market, but despite Clinton advisor James Carville’s comment that if he were reincarnated that he would want to come back as the bond market, since then "you can intimidate everybody," the bond market has little ability to provide the types of tangible and lasting economic benefits necessary to build and sustain a majority coalition for the Democratic party or to allay Country fears that the government is acting in the interest of ordinary citizens (Phillips 1994: 77 and Woodward 1994: 125-126). The focus on deficit reduction also forced the administration to propose a set of regressive energy and gasoline taxes (the latter of which was finally enacted), which promised to further pinch the pocketbooks of ordinary Americans. Moreover, by so quickly and cavalierly jettisoning some of his central campaign promises, Bill Clinton created more doubts about his promise to end "politics as usual" and increased Country cynicism towards his administration.

The Clinton administration also have erred in its staunch support for NAFTA. Not only does the agreement put further downward pressure on U.S. wages, thereby increasing the income inequality at the heart of Country anger at government, but in aggressively pursuing passage of the agreement, the Clinton administration put itself in conflict with organized labor. By attacking one of the Democratic party’s most important constituencies, the administration succeeded in further weakening the Democratic coalition and exacerbating the party’s organizational decline. Also, the time and resources spent by the White House and labor lobbying for and against the agreement would have been better spent on measures of benefit to both groups, such as lobbying for health care reform, an overhaul of campaign finance, or upgrading the organizational capacity of the Democratic party.

Finally, the Clinton administration failed to deliver on the central component of its economic agenda, health care reform. Health care reform represented the type of a broad-based government benefit program that had engendered popular support from activist government in the past and provided the glue which held together the Democratic party since the New Deal. Passage of health care reform would have helped to ameliorate Court and Country divisions by providing evidence that the government can work to resolve complex issues in a way that benefits average Americans. Alas, with the demise of health care reform, the Democrats failed to use the power of government to revitalize their coalition, and in the process furthered the public’s impression that government is incapable of acting in the national interest.

Despite Bill Clinton’s 1992 campaign promises, his administration proved unwilling or unable to alleviate the economic dislocation underlying the Country cynicism against government. Despite a robust economy, 59 percent of those polled in October 1994 believed that the economy was still in a recession (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1995: 324). Exit polls in 1994 showed that only 21 percent of voters thought that their standard of living was getting better, while 55 percent though it was unchanged and 23 percent thought it was worse (Wilcox 1995: 9 and 19).

To the Clinton administration, these were mistaken perceptions, the result of Republican propaganda and its own failure to "get its message out." In fact, a closer look at the economic data shows that while the economy as a whole was growing, the benefits of that growth were concentrated among the wealthy while most Americans saw their economic situation decline. According to Isaac Shapiro of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, "The trend appears to be that the only people who fared well during the recent recovery were upper income." Other data indicate that while corporate profits and the stock market might have been booming in 1994, the real wages and compensation of workers from March 1994 to March 1995 fell by 2.3 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1995). Finally, during the first two years of the Clinton administration, the number of people without health insurance increased as did the number of people in poverty (Pear 1994). One could argue that if the essence of politics is to reward your friends and punish your enemies, the Clinton administration in its first two years in office managed to do the exact opposite.

The mistakes and failures of the Clinton administration provided an opportunity for the Republicans to paint themselves as the Country party and the Democrats as the Court party, and this they did with a vengeance. The centerpiece of the Republican campaign, the Contract With America, was replete with Country themes. According to it, the Republicans sought to "restore the bonds of trust between the people and their elected representatives. . . . To restore accountability to Congress. To end its cycle of scandal and disgrace. To make us all proud again of the way free people govern themselves." (Gillespie and Schellhas 1994: 7-8). The Contract’s specific provisions also stressed such typical Country issues such as political reform, including reform of Congressional procedures and term limits, tax reduction, and limited government.

In the face of this attack, the Democrats were unable to respond effectively. Many Democratic incumbents, facing the prospect of their first difficult campaign in years, chose to retire, further diminishing Democratic chances. For those who chose to run again, the usual tactic of turning popular resentment of Washington to their advantage by stressing their local roots and local accomplishments no longer worked. Their identification with the Clinton administration, congressional scandals, and the legislative failures of the 103rd Congress, left them with little room in which to hide as the full force of Country sentiments fell upon them.

The impact of Country sentiments on the defeat of the Democrats can be seen from the behavior of the 1992 Perot voters, the group that seems to best symbolize modern Country sentiments. For example, polls taken after the 1994 election indicate that these voters are intensely anti-establishment and primarily concerned with the types of political reform associated with Country ideology, with 59 percent saying that their first priority for changing the political system is that "the government should be given back to the people by reducing the influence of special interests and lobbyists" (Greenberg 1995: 256).

The shift of these voters against the Democrats in 1994 was staggering. In 1992, 54 percent of these voters supported the Democratic House candidate. In 1994, however, they abandoned the Democrats and supported the Republicans by a two-to-one margin, 67 to 33 percent (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde: 312 and 331.) The movement of these Perot voters was so decisive, that only white, born-again Christians, self-identified Republicans, and self-identified conservatives supported Republican candidates more strongly (Wilcox: 18-19).

A closer examination of the Perot voters indicates the influence they had on Democratic losses. As Table 1 indicates, the average 1992 Perot vote in seats that switched from the Democrats to the Republicans in 1994 was 20.5 percent; in seats that remained Democratic, however, the average Perot vote was only 16.0 percent. This difference is found in all regions, but it is most striking in the north, where the difference in 5.4 percent.

Table 1. Average 1992 Perot Vote in Democratic Seats

	Total	Switched	N	Held	N	Difference
All Seats	256	20.5	56	16.0	200	4.5
North	173	22.6	37	17.2	136	5.4
South	83	16.3	19	15.0	64	1.3
Northeast	57	20.0	6	15.0	51	5.0
Midwest	51	21.6	16	18.6	45	3.0
West	55	24.9	15	18.0	40	6.9

Source: Data compiled by the author from Duncan and Lawrence (1995).

Another way of looking at the impact of the Perot vote is by looking at Democratic performance in seats that had an above average Perot vote in 1992 and in those that had a below average Perot vote. As Table 2 indicates, Democratic losses were significantly greater in those seats with an above average Perot vote. For example, the Democrats lost just 14.6 percent of their seats in districts with below average Perot votes, they lost 30.3 percent of the seats in districts with an above average Perot vote. This pattern is found in both open and incumbent held seats, and in each region.

SOURCE: Compiled by the author from Duncan and Lawrence (1995).

Strategic Democratic incumbents also seemed to have picked up on the Perot voters’ dissatisfaction with their party. As Jacobsen and Kernell (1983) point out, electoral difficulties are often a prod for incumbents to retire. In Table 3, the average Perot vote is looked at in open seats and in seats with incumbent candidates running. The table indicates a significantly higher averge Perot vote in Democratic open seats than in those with incumbents running, particularly in the north where the Perot vote was the strongest. This suggests that discontent among Perot voters may have hastened the strategic retirements of some Democratic incumbents. In contrast to the Democratic seats, no similar pattern emerges in Republican seats, suggesting that strategic politicians concerns about angry Perot voters was limited to the Democrats.

SOURCE: Compiled by the author from Duncan and Lawrence (1995).

The decline of the Democratic party organization and the failure of the Clinton administration’s economic policies also meant that the party had little with which to mobilize its core constituencies. This is evident in the even more pronounced than usual class-skew in the 1994 election described in Table 1. Between 1990 and 1994, voter turnout among those making $50,000 a year or more rose from 59.2 percent to 60.1 percent, but turnout among those making under $5000 fell from 32.2 percent to 19.9 percent, and from 30.9 percent to 23.3 percent for those making between $5000 and $10,000. In addition, while white turnout rose slightly, from 46.7 percent in 1990 to 46.9 percent in 1994, black turnout fell from 39.2 percent to 37 percent and Hispanic turnout fell from 23.1 percent to 19.1 percent.

SOURCES: "Voter Turnout Falls Sharply Among the Less Affluent," The New York Times, June 11, 1995: A16; U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Characteristics of the Voting-Age Population Reported Having Voted: November 1994" [On-line document], available from http://www.census.gov/ftp/pub/population/socdemo/voting; and U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1990," Current Population Reports, Population Characteristics Series, P-20, Number 453.

The impact of the 1994 elections on the Democratic party goes beyond just the number of seats lost, or even the loss of control of Congress. As mentioned previously, by the early 1990s, the Democratic party consisted of little more than its congressional party, and with the loss of Congress the institutional base of the party becomes hard to identify. Not only have they lost their stronghold in Congress, but it seems unlikely to return in the foreseeable future. Many of the seats lost in 1994 were in districts which had been trending Republican for years and the remaining Democratic incumbents face an even more hostile electoral environment of diminished fundraising prospects and better financed Republican challengers. In addition, the opportunity to revitalize the party offered by Bill Clinton’s control of the White House is extremely limited now that he faces a Republican Congress.

Even more dismal for the Democrats is the fact that they do not have an organizational base to fall back on . After previous election losses, the Democrats could rely on their base of support in unions and political machines to sustain and rejuvenate themselves and their links with ordinary voters. But no such option exists today. In this new environment, the Democrats will likely suffer through a period of intense difficulty, as they face dismal election prospects and its factions fight over what remains of the party.

Still, not all is grim for the Democrats. While regaining control of Congress seems out of reach in the near term, retaining the White House, and thereby retaining some control over their own destiny, is certainly within the realm of possibility for the Democrats. Bill Clinton is a remarkably protean political character, shifting back and forth from liberal to conservative, Arkansas populist to Yale Law School and Rhodes Scholar policy wonk whenever conditions demand. His ability to resurrect his reelection chances should not be dismissed.

One should also keep in mind that despite all the talk of the 1994 election making Clinton’s defeat all but certain, major losses in past midterm elections have not been a clear harbinger of a party switch in the next presidential election. As Table 2 indicates, in six elections (1946, 1950, 1958, 1966, 1974, and 1982) since World War II, the President’s party has posted midterm seat losses larger than the average of loss of 25.5 seats across all elections in the period. In two of these elections (1946 and 1982), the President’s party went on retain control of the White House, while in the other four (1950, 1958, 1966, and 1974) it lost in the next presidential election. But, in three of the four elections when the President’s party lost the White House following big midterm losses (1960, 1968, and 1976), it did so only by the narrowest of margins, suggesting that big midterm losses do not preordain defeat in the next presidential election. One should also remember that the last two switches in control of the White House (1992 and 1980) followed relatively strong midterm performances by the president’s party.

SOURCE: Stanley and Niemi (1994): 114-115, 124-125.

Nor is their any guarantee that the Republicans will be any more successful than the Democrats at alleviating the concerns of Country voters. In fact, the Country rhetoric that the Republicans used so successfully in 1994 contradicts many of the realities of Republican politics and governance. Despite their desire in the 1994 elections for "wresting power from the special interest groups and returning it to the people," now that they are in office, the Republicans are proving even more willing and adept than the Democrats at developing their own links with organized interests (Gillespie and Schellhas 1994: 14). Since the election, the Republicans have begun a brazen and aggressive effort to shakedown PACs for contributions to their incumbents (Berke 1995). Congressional Republicans have also increased the policymaking influence of corporate lobbyists by allowing them to actually draft bills on issues in which their firms have large financial interests (Cloud 1995). Given their association with corporate special interests and newly increased access to PAC money, it is doubtful that the Republicans will seriously attempt the political reforms sought by Country advocates. Finally, Republican economic policies seem unlikely to reverse the growing income inequality that underlies much of the current Country sentiment.

Ironically, the bad news for the Democratic party in the 1994 may also be the good news. While losing control of Congress will cause the party immense difficulties in the short term, in the long term the loss may finally force the Democratic party to undertake the rethinking and rebuilding that it has so long needed but avoided. As long as the party controlled Congress, it remained mired in the status quo. Restoring the party’s links to the grassroots was unnecessary so long as PAC money assured the near invincibility of Democratic congressional incumbents and rethinking the party’s purpose and program was inconceivable when doing so would have meant alienating its congressional incumbents and their special interest benefactors. Freed from these constraints, the Democratic party can finally begin the difficult but essential task of rebuilding its organizations, restoring its links with the grassroots, and developing policies which better represent its core constituencies. If it fails in this task, it can look forward to more elections like that in 1994.